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1Chapter I: General Introduction
I General Introduction
Decision making under risk and agricultural development1.
Agricultural production is subject to various risks which make uninsured agricultural outputs and
incomes highly volatile (Cole et al. 2013; Dercon 2002; Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993).
Given the continuous importance of agricultural production in developing countries together with
the high exposure of farmers to output volatility, uninsured risk is today regarded to be closely
related to rural poverty (Dercon 2005).
The two major sources of risk in agriculture are output risks, especially due to adverse weather
events, and price risks, which are partly due to an inelastic demand for food (Chavas et al. 2010).
In this dissertation the focus lays on output risk. In the standard agricultural economics literature,
output risk is referred to as the variance of agricultural output, or yield (Just and Pope 1978). By
this definition, agricultural inputs such as fertilizer and improved seed, are considered to be risk-
increasing, while pesticides or herbicides are considered to be risk-reducing (e.g. Just and Pope
1979b).
Climate change will further exacerbate output risks, as extreme weather events will increase with
global warming (IPCC 2015). This is especially problematic with regards to poverty, as during
the last 20 years, the countries most affected by extreme weather events were developing
countries (Kreft et al. 2014). However, only 5 percent of the target population in Latin America,
15 percent in Asia and 0.5 percent in Africa have agricultural insurance (McCord and Biese
2015).
Why  do  risky  events  exist?  In  the  classical  economic  theory,  risk  is  referred  to  as  a  “mean-
preserving spread” in the distribution of a random variable, such as the yield (Rothschild et al.
1971). Risk exists because of our inability to control and/or measure all causal predictors of
events,  as  well  as  our  limited  ability  to  process  information,  referred  to  as  bounded  rationality
(Chavas 2004). Risk analysis presumes that we know or can approximate the probability
distribution of the random variable. Independently of which of the different approaches for
probability assessment is drawn on, an individual is faced with a decision on how to behave when
exposed to a risky event.
2 Chapter I: General Introduction
The most wide-spread model to predict behavior under risk is Expected Utility Theory (EUT),
going back to von Neumann and Morgenstern’s seminal work (Neumann and Morgenstern 1944).
Within this prominent theory, subjects make decisions by maximizing expected utility of
outcomes, not the monetary outcome itself, based on risk preferences captured in the curvature of
their utility function. Recent advances in experimental economics came up with ways of
designing experiments to identify the latent risk attitude under some rationality assumptions (Cox
and Harrison 2008). The most widely used experimental methods usually involve an incentivized
choice where subjects trade-off higher monetary payoffs against higher probabilities of obtaining
them (Binswanger 1980; Charness and Gneezy 2012; Eckel and Grossman 2002; Gneezy and
Potters 1997; Holt and Laury 2002). These techniques involve a relatively low cognitive load and
are fairly easy to implement (Crosetto and Filippin 2016). Most studies attempting to measure
individual risk preferences within rural populations in developing countries, starting with the
work of Binswanger (1980), confirm that the average farmer behaves aversely to risk (e.g. Hill
2009; Menapace et al. 2013; Verschoor et al. 2016).
The following papers presented in this dissertation highlight various aspects of risk aversion and
risk  management  with  regards  to  rural  development.  They  result  from  the  analysis  of  farmer
surveys and framed field experiments (Harrison and List 2004) which were conducted from April
to September 2015 in the state of Chiapas in southern Mexico. The study area is  a major maize
growing region, forming part of Mexico’s pacific lowland tropics and a maize mega-environment
with around 100,000 active small and medium scale farmers (van Heerwaarden et al. 2009).
Nevertheless, 52 percent of the population live below the poverty line (CONEVAL 2010). The
specific aspects analyzed in each paper are summed up in the following.
Risk management and technology adoption2.
In a growing strand of literature, risk aversion and the lack of insurance or comparable risk
management tools such as state-contingent credits or savings have been identified as major
explanatory factors for the underinvestment in productivity-enhancing inputs, especially so in
agriculture (Barnett et al. 2008; Cole et al. 2016; Dercon and Christiaensen 2011; Drèze and
Modigliani 1972; Fafchamps 2010; Feder et al. 1985; Just and Pope 2003; Kurosaki and
Fafchamps 2002; Liu and Huang 2013; Lybbert and Barrett 2007; Rosenzweig and Binswanger
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1993; Sandmo 1971). Instead, risk-averse farmers may be left locked into low-risk, low-return
production activities (Barrett and Carter 2013).
Crop insurance could play a vital role as a risk management instrument to enable poor farmers in
developing economies to cope with weather related production risk, hence contributing to poverty
alleviation (Hazell 1992; Hazell et al. 1986; World Bank 2013). Besides allowing ex-post
consumption smoothing, insurance and comparable risk management tools are argued to help
overcoming the situation of low-risk, low-return livelihoods (Dercon 2005; Fan et al. 2013).
Arguably, this can happen either by directly encouraging ex-ante input use and technology
adoption or via reduced credit rationing (Boucher et al. 2008; Brick and Visser 2015; Carter et al.
2016; Elabed and Carter 2015b; Emerick et al. 2016; Farrin and Murray 2014; Ghosh 2001; Giné
and Yang 2009; Hill and Viceisza 2012; Karlan et al. 2014).
Rural insurance markets in developing countries suffer from many constraints, such as moral
hazard, adverse selection and high transaction costs (Hazell 1992). Innovative insurance schemes
that circumvent these constraints, such as weather index insurance, could therefore be promising
tools for poor farmers to cope with weather risk (Binswanger-Mkhize 2012; Miranda and Farrin
2012; Skees and Barnett 1999). However, a main challenge of index insurance is basis risk, the
supposed reason for the low demand of farmers for it (Carter et al. 2016; Clarke 2016; Elabed et
al. 2013; Jensen et al. 2014; McIntosh et al. 2013). Indemnity payouts of index insurance are
based on an objective index value, rather than the individual farmer’s loss (Miranda 1991;
Woodard and Garcia 2008). Since the chosen index never perfectly correlates with the individual
farmers’ output, there will be situations in which an insured farmer faces a loss, but will not
receive an indemnity payment, or vice versa. This risk is referred to as basis risk. Independent
from that, a promising way of insurance marketing lies in bundling index insurance contracts to
loans or inputs (Binswanger-Mkhize 2012; Lybbert and Carter 2014; Ward et al. 2015), which
could induce a positive effect on insurance take-up and technology adoption at the same time.
The case study area to test these issues is the maize growing region La Frailesca in the southern
state of Chiapas, Mexico. The main staple crop in Mexico is maize, and in total, 60 percent of
Mexican maize supply comes from smallholders (Appendini 2014), of whom there are around 3
million in Mexico (Cabestany-Noriega et al. 2013). The changing consumption patterns as a
consequence of urbanization, especially the trend of increased meat demand, will increase the
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demand for yellow maize for livestock feed and industrial use, where Mexico is currently not
self-sufficient, and challenge the production of white maize for human consumption (Appendini
2014). Improving land productivity is therefore of vital policy interest in order to ensure food
security and self-sufficiency (SAGARPA 2013; UNCTAD 2013).
Land productivity is currently stagnating at arounds 2.7 tons per hectare (SAGARPA 2010).
Improved maize varieties, especially hybrids, were found to increase land productivity, farm
household welfare and to reduce poverty in Mexico (Becerril and Abdulai 2010). Even though
improved maize has been available in Mexico for more than 40 years, the degree of adoption by
farmers is relatively low. In total, only about 30 percent of the production units sow improved
seed varieties (INEGI 2014). Farmers were found to favor local varieties because of their “known
quantities” and distrust the unfamiliar improved seeds’ performance (Arellano and Arriaga 2001;
Badstue et al. 2007), which points towards risk aversion as a relevant driver of non-adoption. At
the same time, in the poor south, only around 8.6 percent of agricultural production units have
insurance (Arias 2013). Governmental programs providing insurance subsidies have been
installed to increase coverage (Cabestany-Noriega et al. 2013; Fuchs and Wolff 2011).
Considering this background it is very relevant to study the potential effects that innovative
insurance mechanisms could have on hybrid seed adoption.
In the paper “Insurance for Technology Adoption: An Experimental Evaluation of Schemes and 
Subsidies with Maize Farmers in Mexico” (Chapter II), the effect of bundling a higher yielding 
hybrid maize variety with different insurance schemes on total hybrid seed adoption is estimated 
experimentally. In different treatments, the levels of risk coverage, premium subsidies, and basis 
risk are varied, and farmers’ risk preferences are taken into account. Thereby, it can be 
established whether index-based insurance, bundled with hybrid seed, could be a viable tool for 
incentivizing adoption. This is the first paper to address bundling of insurance and inputs 
experimentally while systematically varying premium cost, coverage level and basis risk.
Explaining variation in uncertainty preferences3.
The existence of a utility function is based on four restrictive axioms: Completeness, Transitivity,
Independence, and Continuity. However, the empirical evidence shows that these axioms are
often violated in standard experiments (e.g. Buschena 2003). Against this background, several
alternative models for decision making under risk have been formulated, with one gaining
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particular attention, namely (Cumulative) Prospect Theory (in the following CPT) (Kahneman
and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992). At the core of this theory lies the observation
of  a  value  function  that  is  steeper  for  losses  than  for  gains,  which  reflects  loss  aversion.  In
addition to that, it was found that people care about small risks, i.e. they tend to overweight small
probabilities and underweight large probabilities. This is referred to as probability weighting. In
experiments with farmers, a violation of EUT in favor of CPT could be confirmed (Bocquého et
al. 2014; Cardenas and Carpenter 2013; Fafchamps 2010; Tanaka et al. 2010; Ward and Singh
2015).
In the real world, decisions under uncertainty often involve only vague probabilities (Kocher and
Trautmann 2008). If one takes into account that uncertainty about probabilities, similarly to
uncertainty about outcomes, affects utility, this leads to a broader concept of decision making
under uncertainty. Uncertainty can then be defined as the sum of risk (i.e. the measurable
component of uncertainty) and ambiguity (i.e. the immeasurable component). Ambiguity
aversion describes disutility generated when individuals are not able to assign unique
probabilities to prospects (Ellsberg 1961). The full range of parameters characterizing behavior
under uncertainty (risk aversion, loss aversion, probability weighting, ambiguity aversion) will
therefore be referred to as uncertainty preferences.
What happens to uncertainty preferences when one experiences a random adverse shock that
incurs income losses? Normative economic theory would stress that preferences remain stable, as
decision makers should not be affected by past, but only incremental outcomes, which is,
however, rarely the case in practice (Thaler and Johnson 1990). Behavioral theories, in contrary,
allow for behavioral learning, for example of changes in observable exogenous factors
(Brunnermeier and Nagel 2008; Malmendier and Nagel 2011). Several authors have confirmed
that risk preferences of subjects in developing countries that experienced natural disasters or
income shocks differed from the average (Callen 2015; Cameron and Shah 2015; Gloede et al.
2015; Said et  al.  2015; Voors et  al.  2012).  However,  the direction of the effect  is  not consistent
across studies. The same holds for predictions from different conceptual frameworks that could
explain these preference shifts: behavioral heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman 1973), changes in
background risk perceptions (Bchir and Willinger 2013; Cameron and Shah 2015; Gollier and
Pratt 1996; Guiso and Paiella 2008; Quiggin 2003), or mental accounting (Imas 2016; Kahneman
and Tversky 1979; Thaler and Johnson 1990). However, these conceptual frameworks and some
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empirical studies suggest that uncertainty preferences beyond EUT may be affected by the
experiences of shocks (Barberis et al. 2001; Fehr-Duda et al. 2011; Li et al. 2011; Reynaud and
Aubert 2013; Walther 2003). Furthermore, research so far has not been able to build a consensus
regarding the relation of a range of sociodemographic variables with individual uncertainty
preference parameters.
Why  is  this  important?  If  one  aims  to  predict  the  behavior  of  farmers  from  their  uncertainty
preferences, the meaningfulness of this relies on the assumption that these preferences remain
stable with changing circumstances (Zeisberger et al. 2012). Also, understanding which aspects
of a person’s sociodemographic background precisely affect their risk preferences can help
identifying the reasons for variation in risk preferences across the population in general.
It is very worthwhile to study these questions in rural Mexico. Natural disasters have been
identified as a significant driver of poverty dynamics in Mexico (Rodriguez-Oreggia et al. 2013).
Furthermore, the country is expected to be among the most negatively affected countries by
climate change (IPCC 2014). Particularly, a large percentage of poor rural communities is located
in environments that may experience a drying and warming trend during the main maize season
(Bellon et al. 2005).
The objective of the paper “The Relationship between Farmers’ Shock Experiences and their
Uncertainty Preferences - Experimental Evidence from Mexico” (Chapter III) is therefore to
estimate the full range of CPT preferences as well as ambiguity aversion parameters with
Mexican farmers. The parameters are related to sociodemographic characteristics of their
households and to the severity of experienced harvest losses. Thereby, the existing literature
explaining variation in uncertainty preferences with past shock experiences and
sociodemographic characteristics is extended by looking at a broader set of variables that
characterize behavior towards uncertainty.
Informal risk management, insurance and other-regarding preferences4.
As  has  been  laid  out,  the  access  of  rural  populations  to  formal  insurance  or  comparable  risk
management  tools  is  to  date  still  very  limited.  This  is  why  they  often  times  rely  on  informal
insurance mechanisms such as informal risk sharing amongst family members or cooperative
groups to protect against adverse income shocks (Besley 1995; Jalan and Ravallion 1999;
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Townsend 1994). It has been argued that solidarity mechanisms emerge quite naturally in
societies that are subject to economic insufficiencies, rather than under affluence (Fafchamps
1992). More specifically, when members of informal social networks engage in risk sharing and
make transfers amongst each other after a member suffered an income shock, this can strengthen
social capital among network members (Dietrich 2013). Interaction amongst individuals can
create social ties, or more precisely, other-regarding preferences. Other-regarding preferences
refer to the weight individuals attach to the well-being of others (Camerer et al. 2011; Kagel and
Roth 1995). They allow explaining a range of non-selfish behaviors from charitable giving to
contributions to public goods (Cooper and Kagel 2016), and, on a macro level, in societies with
stronger other-regarding preferences, economic growth is higher (Cardenas and Carpenter 2008;
Zak and Knack 2001). Other-regarding preferences have been demonstrated to depend on the
history of the interaction between individuals and are therefore dynamic (van Dijk and van
Winden 1997). The introduction of formal insurance to informal networks has been found to
modify the interactions amongst individuals in the network, namely by crowding-out the
exchange of informal transfers (Landmann et al. 2012; Lin et al. 2014). Whether this crowding-
out effect might also affect the dynamics of other-regarding preferences is still an open question.
The relevance of this potential effect in the sample region is given by the documented importance
and long history of social capital in rural Chiapas (Fox and Tversky 1995; Rico García-Amado et
al. 2012). Therefore it is highly relevant to study how it could be affected by an increase in
formal insurance coverage as sought by the government.
The paper “Formal Insurance, Risk Sharing, and the Dynamics of Other-regarding Preferences”
(Chapter IV) analyzes theoretically and experimentally if and under which circumstances the
introduction of formal insurance affects the dynamics of other-regarding preferences.
Importantly, the structure of the shocks is taken into account. An experimental design similar to
van Dijk and van Winden (1997) is applied to measure other-regarding preferences before and
after a group of individuals interact in a repeated solidarity game, resembling a risk sharing
network (Selten and Ockenfels 1998). By exogenously making formal insurance available to
some members of the risk sharing network, the crowding-out effect on risk sharing transfers and
other-regarding preferences causal to insurance can be estimated.
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Outline of the dissertation5.
The dissertation is structured as follows. After this introductory part, Chapter III presents the
paper titled “Insurance for Technology Adoption: An Experimental Evaluation of Schemes and
Subsidies with Maize Farmers in Mexico”, which is to be published in Journal of Agricultural
Economics. Chapter III presents the paper titled “The Relationship between Farmers’ Shock
Experiences and Uncertainty Preferences - Experimental Evidence from Mexico” which is
published GlobalFood Discussion Paper Series (No. 92). Chapter IV presents the paper titled
“Formal Insurance, Risk-Sharing, and the Dynamics of Other-Regarding Preferences”. Finally,
Chapter V provides a summary of the results, discusses some potential limitations, and puts the
findings into the context of related research.
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Abstract
For  farmers  in  developing  countries,  the  combination  of  both  risk  aversion  and  the  lack  of
insurance is often a major impediment to adoption of productivity-enhancing technologies, such
as higher yielding hybrid seed. In a framed field experiment with Mexican maize farmers, we
investigate whether bundling hybrid seed with an insurance scheme can increase its adoption,
while  also  controlling  for  risk  aversion.  We test  insurance  schemes  with  different  levels  of  risk
coverage and premium subsidies and find that (1) all schemes significantly increase the degree of
adoption of the higher yielding seed, (2) partial insurance schemes perform worse than full
insurance, (3) weather index insurance with geographical basis risk performs no worse than
indemnity insurance, and (4) premium subsidies significantly increase the adoption effect of
indemnity insurance, but not that of index insurance.
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Abstract
A farmer’s uncertainty preferences can play a large role in how he makes production decisions on
the farm. We attempt to understand how farmers’ household characteristics as well as past
harvest shocks affect uncertainty preferences of maize farmers in southern Mexico. By using a
series of incentivized lottery games, we estimate coefficients that correspond to Cumulative
Prospect Theory, namely the probability weighting function, the curvature of the value function
and loss aversion, along with a coefficient for ambiguity aversion. These are estimated
controlling for survey data of sociodemographic characteristics as well as maize harvest losses
incurred between 2012-2014. Our results provide evidence that having experienced more severe
harvest losses leads to more risk aversion and stronger overweighting of small probabilities.
Higher harvest loss severity is not related to loss aversion or ambiguity aversion.
JEL classifications: D810; Q120; Q540
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Introduction1.
There is now vast evidence that farmers in developing countries tend to be risk averse, as first
analyzed by Binswanger (1980), and face high degrees of uncertainty with respect to their
production (Just and Pope 1979a; Roumasset 1974). It is also a well-known finding that risk
aversion inhibits the use of new, productivity-increasing technologies and inputs, such as
fertilizers and improved seeds (Dercon and Christiaensen 2011; Engle-Warnick et al. 2011; Feder
et al. 1985; Knight et al. 2003; Liu 2013; Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993; Verschoor et al.
2016). In this way, risk aversion may lock poor agricultural households into poverty traps (e.g.
Carter and Barrett 2006).
To better understand the lack of consensus on how farmers’ sociodemographic background,
decisions and experiences are related to their risk preferences, researchers have gained interest in
eliciting these preferences experimentally in the field (Binswanger 1980; Engle-Warnick et al.
2011; Gloede et al. 2015; Liu 2013; Miyata 2003; Said et al. 2015; Tanaka et al. 2010). As
compared to deriving risk preferences from observational data, experiments allow for the
distinction between mere risk response, which could originate from other constraints, from innate
risk preferences (Just and Pope 2003). The majority of studies to date, however, elicit only a
single parameter of the utility function, namely its curvature, assuming a certain functional form
grounded in Expected Utility Theory, or use ordinal, non-parametric measures for risk aversion
based on self-assessment scales. These may not allow accommodating a range of observed
anomalies of behaviors in the field (Just and Pope 2003). Also, if loss aversion is not accounted
for, it may act as a confounding factor for risk aversion (Crosetto and Filippin 2013).
Only a few authors have broken down risk preferences along the lines of (Cumulative) Prospect
Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992) when analyzing behavior
of rural populations, estimating separately individual parameters for the curvature of the value
function, loss aversion and non-linear probability weighting. The seminal contribution by Tanaka
et al. (2010) offers an experimental approach to do so. Allowing for a wider range of individual-
specific parameters describing behavior under uncertainty also proved more accurate in
predicting individual choices (Gloeckner and Pachur 2012).
Furthermore, broader concepts of decision making take into account uncertainty as the sum of
risk (the measurable component) and ambiguity (the immeasurable component). Ambiguity
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theory considers the cases where individuals are not able to assign unique probabilities to
possible outcomes, but form subjective beliefs over probability distributions (Ellsberg 1961).
These subjective beliefs are not neutral, as proposed by Subjective Expected Utility Theory, but
utility is decreased through uncertainty about probabilities depending on the degree of ambiguity
aversion (Halevy 2007). Ambiguity aversion hence describes the relative disutility generated by
subjective beliefs about probability distributions of payouts, compared to uncertainty generated
by objective lotteries (Klibanoff et al. 2005). In the context of farming, research has shown that
ambiguity aversion plays a role in technology adoption, as with new technologies such as
improved seeds the probability distributions of the harvest output are generally unknown ex-ante
(Barham et al. 2014; Engle-Warnick et al. 2011; Liu 2013).
Researchers have yet to build a consensus on how risk preferences vary with different
sociodemographic characteristics or past experiences, such as the experiences of catastrophic
shocks and losses (Said et al. 2015). Why is this important? If one aims to predict the technology
adoption behavior of farmers from their experimentally elicited risk preferences, the
meaningfulness  of  this  relies  on  the  assumption  that  these  preferences  remain  stable  over  time
and  with  changing  circumstances  (Zeisberger  et  al.  2012),  such  as  recent  harvest  loss
experiences.
Against this background, the objective of this paper is to (1) estimate farmers’ risk aversion, loss
aversion, probability weighting and ambiguity aversion parameters, (2) relate them to the
sociodemographic characteristics of their households, and furthermore (3) to analyze how the
severity of experienced harvest losses affects them. Thereby we extend the existing literature
explaining variation in uncertainty preferences by past adverse shock experiences by looking at a
broader set of variables that characterize one’s behavior under uncertainty. Therefore we exploit
survey data of Mexican maize farmers regarding their recent experiences of harvest shocks and
use them in our estimations of prospect theory preference parameters and ambiguity aversion.
Evidence suggests that shocks by natural disasters are a significant driver of poverty dynamics in
Mexico (Rodriguez-Oreggia et al. 2013). While the works by Li et al. (2011) and Reynaud and
Aubert (2013) address the more general effect of natural disasters on risk aversion and
probability weighting, this is the only study to investigate the relationship of harvest loss
experiences on all three prospect theory parameters, simultaneously also taking into account
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ambiguity aversion. Additionally, we include a wide range of sociodemographic variables into
our analysis that allows us to put our findings in the context of the existing literature, for which
we also give an extensive overview. This has not been systematically done up to date.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present a review of the literature
on stability of uncertainty preferences and on the relationship between sociodemographics and
past shock experience and uncertainty preferences. Section 3 explains details on our sampling
region and data collection strategy. In Section 4 we present our conceptual framework to elicit
preference parameters according to Cumulative Prospect Theory as well as ambiguity aversion,
followed by the experimental design in Section 5. Section 6 presents our estimation strategy,
Section  7  and  8  present  our  results  and  Section  9  concludes  the  paper  with  a  discussion  of  the
results and policy implications.
Literature review and hypotheses generation2.
Stability of uncertainty preferences2.1
There have been various attempts to investigate the long-term stability of risk preferences. For
example, Harrison et al. (2005) show that constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) coefficients
measured at two distinct points in time over a span of 5 to 6 months did not change significantly.
Andersen et al. (2008) find similar results. However, there are only a few studies that look at the
stability of preferences derived from Cumulative Prospect Theory (in the following, CPT) over
time. Baucells and Villasis (2006) confirm the stability of the “reflection effect” over time, i.e.
the phenomenon of risk averse behavior for gains and risk seeking behavior for losses. Zeisberger
et al (2012) and Wölbert and Riedl (2013) show that respondents’ probability weighting, loss
aversion and value function curvature remained consistent over several weeks’ time. Duersch et
al. (2017) find stability over time for the ambiguity aversion estimates for 57 percent of their
subjects.
These results indicate a general tendency of preference stability over time, which is in line with
normative economic theory, insisting that decision makers only take into account incremental
outcomes. However, it is rarely the case that decisions are truly made in temporal isolation, but
are generally taken in the light of preceding outcomes (Thaler and Johnson 1990). Behavioral
theories leave room for behavioral learning, for example from changes in observable exogenous
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factors (Brunnermeier and Nagel 2008; Malmendier and Nagel 2011), or more specifically,
shocks (Said et al. 2015; Voors et al. 2012).
Shock experiences and uncertainty preferences2.2
Several behavioral heuristics may play a role when risk preferences change after experiencing a
shock, even without having direct personal consequences in the form of losses: the availability
heuristic, inducing decision makers to assess likelihood of an event based on the most readily
available information, the representative heuristic that causes subjects to overweight more salient
events (Tversky and Kahneman 1974), and the associativeness heuristic (Mullainathan 2002).
Associativeness refers to the notion that events may affect beliefs through the memories they
invoke and may result in an overreaction to contemporary information, as completely
uninformative signals can influence beliefs by affecting what one recalls. By these heuristics,
however, the direction of a change in risk preferences after a shock is not predetermined.
The experience of natural disasters and shocks may also change individuals’ perceptions of the
background risk they are facing, even when they do not involve personal losses (Cameron and
Shah 2015). Background risk refers to non-diversifiable, non-insurable risk, usually thought of as
zero-mean and independent of other risks. What is the effect of an increase background risk on
risk preferences? There is contradicting evidence, both from theory and empirics. On the one
hand, Gollier and Pratt (1996) demonstrate in their model that a rise in background risk causes
expected utility maximizing individuals to make less risky choices; a behavior referred to as “risk
vulnerability”. Providing an empirical test, Guiso and Paiella (2008) support this hypothesis,
finding that investors facing income uncertainty or a risk of becoming liquidity constrained
exhibit a higher degree of absolute risk aversion. Beaud and Willinger (2014) provide additional
evidence for this phenomenon. Hence, when perceived background risk increases over time, it
may make subjects become more risk averse. On the other hand, there is empirical evidence of
marginal diminishing sensitivity, suggesting that in already risky environments the addition of a
small independent risk should not have an influence on behavior or even decrease risk aversion
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979). This notion is supported by the theoretical work of Quiggin
(2003) for different utility function specifications.
Treating successive harvests as a form of sequential gambles, CPT would predict an increase in
risk taking following losses when decisions are evaluated jointly in the same choice bracket
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(Read et al. 1999), i.e. losses are integrated with subsequent outcomes and reference points are
not (yet) updated accordingly. Then, from their perspective, subjects make choices in the “loss”
domain, where they act risk loving (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Thaler and Johnson (1990)
argue that more risk taking will only occur if the risky prospect gives subjects the probability to
break-even, i.e. to return to the prior reference point. When each gamble is evaluated separately
within a single choice bracket, i.e. when decisions are narrowly framed, then reference points
change after experiencing losses, in which case CPT would predict a decrease in risk taking.
When the subsequent risky prospect does not allow the possibility to break-even, then quasi-
hedonic editing comes into play. Under quasi-hedonic editing, subjects cannot integrate future
outcomes with prior outcomes. Hence, more risk aversion would be observed after losses and
more risk taking after gains; the latter is referred to as the house money effect (Thaler and
Johnson 1990). Accommodating these contrasting findings, Imas (2016) presents a model
distinguishing between “realized” losses, those leading to an updating of the reference point and
not integrated with future outcomes, and “paper” losses, those evaluated in the same mental
account with future outcomes. In empirical studies it is hard to determine the appropriate
reference point for a decision maker; usually the status quo or current assets holdings are referred
to (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). When estimating risk and loss aversion in experiments one
generally sets the reference point exogenously at zero for simplicity (e.g. Bocquého et al. 2014).
In our context, that seems reasonable as it appears unlikely that harvest losses from the last
season(s) are evaluated in a joint mental account with outcomes in the lab, which involve lower
stakes that do not allow for the recapturing of potential severe harvest failures.
Nevertheless, it is proposed in the literature that losses, even when not evaluated in a joint mental
account, may make individuals more loss averse in future decision making situations involving
losses (Barberis et al. 2001). Losses, they argue, are more painful after prior losses because of an
increased sensitivity. Alternatively, the experience of losses may make the possibility of losses
appear more salient in current choice options, for which decision makers overweight loss
outcomes and behave more loss aversely (Bordalo et al. 2012).
Personal experience of losses can also lead to a change in subjectively perceived probabilities of
incurring the same losses again. Menapace et al. (2013) find that past harvest loss experiences
significantly increased farmers’ perceived likelihood of recurring losses in the current growing
season. Whether this changes the generic probability weights they give to any low-probability
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risky outcome is not clear, though. From this result however it seems plausible to infer that the
experience of losses may change how farmers view small probabilities of outcomes and
potentially change the weight they give to them. Heterogeneity in probability weighting has been
scarcely studied to date (Fehr-Duda et al. 2011). Walther (2003) presents a model in which non-
linear probability weighting emerges as a result of anticipating either elation or disappointment
when  the  uncertainty  of  a  prospect  is  resolved.  His  model  predicts  that  higher  sensitivity  to
anticipated emotions when resolving uncertainty leads to a higher degree of probability
distortion. In a similar vein, Fehr-Duda et al. (2011) show that the degree of probability
weighting is affected by current mood, and that subjects reporting a below-normal mood had a
more inflected weighting function, a result similar to Kliger and Levy (2008) analyzing US
investor data. Even though the conceptual link is not so straight forward, it seems very reasonable
that probability weighting is affected by the experience of low-probability shocks (Reynaud and
Aubert 2013). It could be the case that after experiencing severe harvest losses, farmers may
generally be in a more aggrieved mood, which could distort their weighting of probabilities over
risky outcomes. Similarly, it could make them more wary towards ambiguity and hence less
likely to choose ambiguous gambles.
Only a few empirical field experiments explicitly address the effects of exogenous shocks on
uncertainty preferences, finding little consensus. Table III-1 gives an overview of relevant studies
and the found effects. Most of them deal with risk preference changes after natural disasters in a
between-subject comparison. In the following, we highlight select studies involving samples from
developing countries. Bchir and Willinger (2013), for instance, find more risk seeking behavior
amongst the poorer population in areas affected by mudflows. Gloede et al. (2015) analyze how
self-reported risk preferences are related to the number and type of shocks experienced by a large
sample in Thailand and Vietnam. The authors find that having experienced agricultural shocks
made respondents more risk averse in Thailand, while in Vietnam demographic and idiosyncratic
shocks led to more risk aversion. Said et al. (2015) elicit risk preferences in the aftermath of the
2010 flood in Pakistan. They find that people living in a flood-affected area display, on average,
more risk-seeking behavior, while personally having experienced flood losses made people
behave more risk aversely. Cameron and Shaw (2015) relate risk preferences to experiences of
earthquakes and floods. They find that those subjects recently affected by one of those natural
disasters were more likely to be risk averse, while the number of disasters or the total value of the
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damage experienced had only minor effects. Apart from that, the authors also find that flood
experiences caused people to update the probability of another flood, and this perceived increase
in background risk lead to higher risk vulnerability. Broadening the scope beyond just developing
countries, Page et al. (2014) look at preferences in the aftermath of floods in Australia. They find
that people who have lost large amounts in a flood were more risk seeking afterwards, possibly
because they had hopes of gaining back what they had lost, a finding that is in line with the
break-even hypothesis (Thaler and Johnson 1990).
Most research on the role of shocks on risk preferences to date, however, uses either simple non-
parametric ways to classify risk preferences, or explicit utility function specifications within
Expected Utility Theory (in the following, EUT) (Cameron and Shah 2015; Eckel et al. 2009;
Gloede et al. 2015). Nevertheless, there is broad evidence of non-EUT preferences of both
farmers in developed (Bocquého et al. 2014) and in developing countries (Brauw and Eozenou
2014; Petraud 2014; Tanaka et al. 2010). This makes it worthwhile to study the effect of shocks
in a CPT framework, which has only been done partially by a few authors before for developing
countries.  Voors et  al.  (2012) look at  the effect  of exposure to violent conflict  in the context of
the Burundi Civil War on risk preferences while allowing for the reflection effect (Kahneman and
Tversky 1979). The authors find that exposure to conflict increased risk seeking in the positive
domain while it does not affect attitudes in the negative domain. Li et al. (2011) look at people in
southern China who suffered from large amounts of snow in 2008 and people affected by the
Sichuan earthquake in 2008. Their results show that after a shock respondents tended to be more
risk  seeking  in  the  positive  and  more  risk  averse  in  the  negative  domain.  They  also  find  that
respondents were more likely to overweight small probabilities. Reynaud and Aubert (2013)
analyze the CPT parameters with rural Vietnamese household heads after a large flood. They
find, similar to Voors et al. (2012), that respondents who experienced the flood were more likely
to pick a safer lottery in the negative domain and the riskier lottery in the positive domain during
a risk experiment. Expecting a future flood made people additionally behave more risk aversely,
while the flood experience had no effect on the probability weighting function.
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In the light of the aforementioned mixed findings, we formulate the following hypothesis without
attempting to predict the direction of the relationships:
H1: The severity of past harvest losses affects farmers’ uncertainty preferences,
namely probability weighting, risk, loss and ambiguity aversion.
Sociodemographic characteristics and uncertainty preferences2.3
Research so far has not been able to build some consensus regarding the relation of a range of
sociodemographic variables with uncertainty preferences. Table III-2 and III-3 show the
fluctuation in evidence from selected studies with rural samples from developing countries on the
role of most commonly used sociodemographic variables.






















Sample 18 Sample 29
Age Ns +* +** +** Ns Ns   - +*** - **
Gender;
female
+** Ns Ns  Ns +** Ns Ns Ns
Education Ns -*** Ns +** Ns Ns -*** -***
Income/
wealth








* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0. p-values from tests used in the respective papers (where it applies).
Ns: not significant. + denotes more risk aversion, - denotes less risk aversion.
Blanks indicate that variables were not tested in the respective study.
1India; 2Indonesia; 3Ethiopia; 4Vietnam; 5Peru; 6China; 7Pakistan; 8Thailand;9Vietnam
Source: Authors’ own illustration
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To start with, there is strong evidence that age plays a role in risk preference. Said et al. (2015),
Tanaka et al. (2010), and Miyata (2003) all find that older farmers tend to be more risk averse.
Gloede et  al.  (2015) look at  farmers in both Thailand and Vietnam and find that  age affects the
two samples differently: Thai farmers become more risk averse with age whereas the opposite
occurrs with their Vietnamese counterparts. The role that gender plays has had a less definite
result. Liu (2013) finds that women are more risk averse than men. Biswanger’s (1980) results
show a slightly higher degree of risk aversion among women. Many of the other studies could not
find a statistically significant link between gender and risk preference (Engle-Warnick et al.
2011; Gloede et al. 2015; Said et al. 2015; Tanaka et al. 2010). Education’s role in risk aversion
is very unclear. Tanaka et al. (2010) find more years of education to be positively associated with
risk aversion, whereas Binswanger (1980), Miyata (2003), and Gloede et al. (2015) find the
opposite. The role of wealth in risk aversion is somewhat less muddled. Higher wealth is
associated with less risk aversion in most studies (Engle-Warnick et al. 2011; Gloede et al. 2015;
Miyata 2003; Tanaka et al. 2010; Yesuf and Bluffstone 2009). Liu (2013), however, finds the
opposite: greater wealth is related to more risk aversion. Both Miyata (2003) and Engle-Warnick
et al. (2011) find that farmers from larger households are less risk averse. Miyata (2003)











et al. (2011)3  Liu (2013)2
Age Ns Ns Ns Ns Ns
Gender; female Ns Ns -*** Ns Ns
Education Ns Ns Ns Ns Ns
Income/wealth -*** Ns Ns Ns Ns
Distance to market Ns Ns
Land owned Ns Ns Ns
Household size +***
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0. p-values from tests used in the respective papers (where it applies).
Ns: not significant. + denotes a positive, - a negative effect of the respective variable on the parameter.
Blanks indicate that variables were not tested in the respective study.
1Vietnam; 2China; 3Peru
Source: Authors’ own illustration
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hypothesizes that this could be from the increases in generations living in a household, as
respondents that still live with their parents are also less risk averse.
For the parameters beyond utility function curvature, few conclusive correlations have been
found with respect to sociodemographic characteristics. Tanaka et al. (2010) find that farmers
with greater wealth are less averse to losses. Tanaka et al. (2006) find that women’s probability
weighting function is less inflected. Ward and Singh (2015) find that women are more ambiguity
averse, while Engle-Warnick et al. (2011) only find that a greater household size is associated
with higher levels of ambiguity aversion.
Again, in the light of the mixed prior evidence, we formulate the following general hypothesis,
without attempting to predict the direction of the relationships:
H2: Sociodemographic characteristics affect farmers’ uncertainty preferences, namely
probability weighting, risk, loss and ambiguity aversion.
Study region and data collection3.
Data for this study was acquired through surveys and lottery-based experiments with Mexican
maize farmers in the southern state of Chiapas. Maize holds a special status in Mexican
agriculture as the crop’s origins lay within the country (Hellin et al. 2014). It accounts for the
highest percentage of agricultural land, is still a core part of the Mexican diet, and remains of
vital importance for the rural economy (Eakin et al. 2014). Currently, the state is one of the
poorest states in Mexico. Chiapas’ GDP per capita in 2013 was $54,605 MXN or $4,113 USD
(Rodriguez and Luna).3 In the studied municipalities, 52 percent live below the poverty line
(CONEVAL 2010). Climate risk poses a growing challenge for rural Mexico (Vermeulen 2011).
Nationally, between 1980-2000, Mexico experienced over 3,000 floods and over 1,000 types of
other weather related shocks (Monterroso et al. 2014). The state of Chiapas is in the very high
vulnerability category for weather risks.
Data was collected from April to July 2015 in the maize growing region La Frailesca in Chiapas.
The sample encompasses 282 farmers from 10 villages in the neighboring municipalities of
Villaflores and Villa Corzo. The region belongs to Mexico’s pacific lowland tropics and forms
3Exchange rate for 2013 was $13.275MXN to $1USD according to US IRS (irs.gov).
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part of a maize mega-environment with around 100,000 active small and medium scale farmers-
an environment of “modernized smallholder agriculture” (van Heerwaarden et al. 2009).
Participants were sampled based on a stratified procedure. First, 10 villages were selected.4 In the
sampled villages, the sessions were announced publicly with help of the village head, and people
could  sign  up  to  participate.  The  only  criteria  were  that  they  were  older  than  18,  had  basic
numeric skills, and carried the major responsibility for production decisions on their farms.
Experiments were then conducted in small groups of 5 to 15 people in the village assembly
rooms. The researcher and four enumerators were always present. Experiments were
incentivized.
Conceptual framework4.
Despite the relatively large literature on stability of risk preferences after experiencing shocks,
these studies generally rely on EUT and accordingly,  a one-dimensional utility function with its
curvature being the only parameter describing risk preference. However, as formalized Tversky
and Kahneman (1979) in CPT, people (1) behave differently when confronted with losses or
gains and (2) tend to overweight small probabilities and underweight large probabilities. When
confronted with risky prospects that involve a potential loss, for equal probabilities, a loss will
reduce the value of that prospect by a larger factor than an equal gain would increase it. Also, we
incorporate a measure of ambiguity aversion that we estimate simultaneously.
The estimation of the CPT parameters is based on the functional forms proposed by Tversky and
Kahneman (1992). The utility of a prospect 	is given by two separate value functions, one for
the situation where both possible outcomes 	 and  of a risky option fall into the gain domain,
i.e. are larger than the reference point	  ( > >  or > > ), and where the lower outcome
falls into the loss domain ( < <  or < < ). For simplicity, we set the reference point in
our experiments equal to zero. The utility of a prospect can then be written the following way
(Tversky and Kahneman 1992):
( ) =	
( )+ ( )[ ( )− ( )]		 	 > > 0	 	 > > 0
( ) ( ) + (1 − ( )) ( )	 	 > 0 > 	             (1)
4The villages were drawn purposefully with assistance of a local professor to cover a wide variability of the degree of
technology adoption, namely of hybrid seed.
40 Chapter III: The Relationship between Farmers’ Shock Experiences and
Uncertainty Preferences - Experimental Evidence from Mexico
The value functions are defined as a piecewise power value function
( ) =	
													 	 	 ≥ 0
− | |		 	 < 0 	      (2)
The letter  denotes the loss aversion coefficient and  the risk aversion coefficient. The
probability weighting function is defined as in Prelec (1998), with exponent  denoting the
degree to which probabilities  are systematically over- or underweighted:
( ) = [−(− ( )) ]       (3)
Ambiguity aversion is incorporated simultaneously and represented through an additional
function (∙) as proposed by Ward and Singh (2015), which is based on the model by Klibanoff
et al. (2005):
( ) = ( )      (4)
The parameter  denotes an additional sanction on utility when unique probabilities are unknown
to a decision maker. Our experimental design and econometric approach allow us to estimate
simultaneously the four parameters , , λ and .
Experimental design5.
A set of 5 series of lottery choice games totaling 57 decisions based on Ward and Singh (2015)
were conducted to determine four behavioral coefficients, i.e. value function curvature ( ), loss
aversion (λ),  ambiguity  aversion  ( ) as well as the probability weighting parameter ( ).  A
piecewise power value function as shown in equation (1), a probability weighting function as in
equation (3) and a functional representation of ambiguity aversion as in equation (4) are assumed.
The  experiment  by  Ward  and  Singh  (2015)  is  a  simplified  version  of  the  seminal  approach  by
Tanaka et al. (2010), but easier to communicate in contexts of low education, as the safe option
generally consists of a certainty equivalent instead of a “safer” lottery. Both methods allow for
estimation of both EUT and CPT consistent parameters. We simplified the approach further by
using colored balls (green for winning and orange for losing draws) instead of numbered chips, as
in the original version of the experiment. Payout values were used as in Ward and Singh (2015)
where they were calibrated by the authors in order to allow for a simultaneous and unique
identification of the behavioral parameters. For this study, the values were scaled to Mexican
pesos ($MXN). The nominal value of payouts given in the lottery was converted 1:100 to the
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experimental payout (i.e., for every $1,000 MXN in the lottery, participants earned $10 MXN in
cash). Participants received an endowment of $10.50 MXN for this experiment, which
represented $1,050 MXN in experimental monetary units.
With exception of Series 1, the colored balls for the respective lottery option were put in the bag
at  the  sight  of  the  participants  and  visualized  on  a  poster,  so  participants  always  knew  the
composition of balls for the respective lottery round. The first two series of the experiment
consisted of two identical lottery choice lists (see Table III-4). The only difference in Series 1
was that participants did not know the composition of the balls, but were informed that there are
10 balls in the bag in total, and that there are between 0 and 10 winning (green) and losing
(orange) balls. The payoff for the losing draw (orange ball) in the lottery declines successively
for each choice row from being higher to lower than the respective safe payout, while the
probabilities remain constant within each series, so the expected value of the lottery option is
decreasing with each decision. The participants know so as they get the complete table with all
the decision rows for the respective lottery series at a time as depicted in Table III-4, Table III-5,
and Table III-6. Monotonic switching was enforced as done in Ward and Singh (2015) and
Tanaka et al. (2010) by telling participants they could only switch once from choosing the lottery
to choosing the safe payout. Not switching, or switching in the first round are explicitly
considered as possible options.5
Lottery Series 1 and 2 serve to identify ambiguity aversion. In Series 1 the number of winning or
losing balls is not revealed, so participants had to form a subjective probability ̂ of drawing a
green  ball.  As  pointed  out  by  Ward  and  Singh  (2015),  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that ̂ =
0.5	since Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason should hold. After making their decisions in
Series 1, participants were revealed the true probability of = 0.5	 In Series 2, while the payoffs
remained the same, with the only difference that participants were shown the content of the bag,
revealing equal odds, i.e. five green and five orange balls. Under ambiguity theory, it is assumed
that individuals’ utility is lowered when no unique probabilities but only expected probabilities
can  be  assigned  to  possible  outcomes.  For  given  and ,  if  participants  were  indifferent  to
ambiguity, they would not change the point at which they switched from the lottery to the riskless
5Additional to the example of never switching and switching in the first decision, we gave in each session examples
of switching in decision 6 and 10.
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option.  If  participants  were  ambiguity  averse,  they  would  switch  at  an  earlier  round  in  the
ambiguous lottery than in the unambiguous, equal odds lottery. If participants were ambiguity
loving, they would switch later in the ambiguous lottery than in the unambiguous one.
Series 3 and 4 vary the probabilities of winning in the lottery option from 0.1 to 0.7, respectively.
This allows estimating the degree of probability overweighting. As opposed to the first two
series, the winning payoffs in Option B are rising, ceteris paribus, within each series, i.e. the
expected value of the lottery increases, while probabilities stay the same within the series for all
decision rows (see Table III-5). Again, monotonic switching was enforced. Switching in the first
decision row as well as not switching at all was explicitly allowed in all series.6
Series 5 is used to determine loss aversion parameters. Here, participants chose between two
lottery options, where the losing draw in both options implies a loss (see Table III-6). However,
Option B involves both higher possible gains and losses. In case a participant loses, the loss
amount is subtracted from their initial endowment.
After the experiment, an individual survey on agricultural production, experienced harvest
shocks, as well as sociodemographic characteristics of their households was conducted with all
participants. For the payment of the experiment, one of the total 57 decisions was selected
randomly for all participants in one session. Those who chose the safe payout in the respective
round, received this amount. Among those who opted for the lottery option, one participant
volunteered to draw from a bag containing the respective number of green and orange balls
applying to the selected decision row. If green was drawn, participants received the higher
payout. When orange was drawn, participants received the lower or negative payout which was
then subtracted from the initial endowment. All nominal earnings were then divided by 100
before they were paid out in cash.
6For round 3, we gave the examples of not switching, switching in the first round, and switching in round 28 and 36.
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Table III-4: Lottery Series 1 and 2
Option A Option B
Decision Green Orange
1 $1,000 $2,000 $1,000
2 $1,000 $2,000 $800
3 $1,000 $2,000 $750
4 $1,000 $2,000 $500
5 $1,000 $2,000 $400
6 $1,000 $2,000 $350
7 $1,000 $2,000 $300
8 $1,000 $2,000 $250
9 $1,000 $2,000 $200
10 $1,000 $2,000 $100
11 $1,000 $2,000 $0
Option A Option B
Decision 5 Green 5 Orange
12 $1,000 $2,000 $1,000
13 $1,000 $2,000 $800
14 $1,000 $2,000 $750
15 $1,000 $2,000 $500
16 $1,000 $2,000 $400
17 $1,000 $2,000 $350
18 $1,000 $2,000 $300
19 $1,000 $2,000 $250
20 $1,000 $2,000 $200
21 $1,000 $2,000 $100
22 $1,000 $2,000 $0
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Table III-5: Lottery Series 3 and 4
Table III-6: Lottery Series 5
Option A Option B
Decision 1 Green 9 Orange
23 $500 $1,300 $250
24 $500 $1,400 $250
25 $500 $1,600 $250
26 $500 $1,800 $250
27 $500 $2,050 $250
28 $500 $2,350 $250
29 $500 $2,800 $250
30 $500 $3,150 $250
31 $500 $3,600 $250
32 $500 $4,250 $250
33 $500 $5,200 $250
34 $500 $6,650 $250
35 $500 $9,050 $250
36 $500 $14,000 $250
Option A Option B
Decision 7 Green 3 Orange
37 $2,000 $2,800 $250
38 $2,000 $2,850 $250
39 $2,000 $3,000 $250
40 $2,000 $3,100 $250
41 $2,000 $3,250 $250
42 $2,000 $3,450 $250
43 $2,000 $3,650 $250
44 $2,000 $3,850 $250
45 $2,000 $4,100 $250
46 $2,000 $4,350 $250
47 $2,000 $4,750 $250
48 $2,000 $5,250 $250
49 $2,000 $5,950 $250
50 $2,000 $6,850 $250
Option A Option B
Decision 5 Green 5 Orange 5 Green 5 Orange
51 $1,250 -$200 $1,500 -$1,050
52 $200 -$200 $1,500 -$1,050
53 $50 -$200 $1,500 -$1,050
54 $50 -$200 $1,500 -$800
55 $50 -$400 $1,500 -$800
56 $50 -$400 $1,500 -$700
57 $50 -$400 $1,500 -$550
45Chapter III: The Relationship between Farmers’ Shock Experiences and
Uncertainty Preferences - Experimental Evidence from Mexico
Estimation6.
Parameters6.1
To estimate the four preference coefficients, we utilize the maximum likelihood (ML) approach
illustrated in Harrison (2008) and also applied by Bocquého et al. (2014). Expected utility for
each option is the sum of the product of the probabilities weighted as in equation (3) and utility
values from the value function in equation (2) for each outcome in each lottery decision row
with 	possible payoffs:
= ∑ [ × ], (5)
For the lottery decisions with ambiguity, the expected utility is additionally exponentiated by  as
in equation (4). The difference in expected utilities for the prospects displayed on the right side
(Option B) and left hand side (Option A) of the lottery choice lists, is calculated for each
participant  and each of the 57 choice rows:
= − 		 	 (6)
where  denotes the expected utility of the right hand option (Option B) and  of the left
hand option (Option A) in the lottery series, respectively. This latent index, based on the
unknown parameter ,  is linked to the observed choices using a standard cumulative normal
distribution function ( ). This “probit” function specification transforms  into a number
between 0 and 1. We assume decisions are made with random error, so the binary choice between
Option A and B in the lottery-based experiment is described by:




We are looking for the parameters , ,  and  that maximize the following log-likelihood
function for the given choice  and payout amounts :
( ; ; ; 	 ; ; 	 ) = ∑ ( ) × ( = 1) + 	[1− ( )] × ( = 0) (8)	
Here,  denotes lottery choices pooled over individuals and  denotes a vector of
sociodemographic characteristicscommonly related with risk preferences or relevant controls in
relation to shocks, as well as variables indicating the severity of harvest shock experiences.
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Definition of shocks6.2
Furthermore, we specify two different variables to account for an individuals’ harvest loss
severity. Shock experience is defined based on loss percentages , i.e. absolute maize harvest
loss in year  of subject  in tons, , divided by the sum of the absolute loss  and harvest
amount  of farmer  in  in tons, multiplied by 100:
= ∙ 100 (9)	
We use two variables specified as follows as measures for severity of harvest loss experience:




∑ A dummy variable taking the value 1 if the average percentage of harvest lost over the years
2012-14, i.e. ∑ , is greater than the 80th percentile of the sample. This corresponds to an
average loss from 2012-14 of 25 percent of the harvest. This binary variable allows us to
identify a “treatment group”, i.e. those farmers most severely hit by harvest shocks.
Confounding factors and omitted variables6.3
When estimating the effect of shocks on risk preferences, one must take into account several
potential obstacles. One drawback is a potential selection bias. Self-selection into more or less
shock and loss prone plot types could have occurred based on farmers’ uncertainty preferences,
as was supposed by Olbrich et al. (2011). However, we argue that self-selection is not an issue in
the Mexican context. The possibility of farmers choosing their plots based on their uncertainty
preferences is largely ruled out due to Mexico’s “ejido” system. This form of land titling was
installed after the Mexican revolution and redistributed large estates to the farmers in the form of
small plots that could not be sold (e.g. Sweeney et al. 2013). More than 73 percent of
landholdings in our sample are under the “ejido” system.
If our shock variable does not suffer from self-selection, there may still be observed variables that
could act as confounding factors. Uncertainty preferences could affect input level choices and
thereby affect loss severity. For example, farmers who are less risk averse might generally use
less pesticides and herbicides, or use more fertilizer and higher quality seed (Knight et al. 2003;
Liu 2013; Verschoor et al. 2016). This could mean that more risk seeking farmers are also more
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likely to incur harvest losses. In order to deal with this potential endogeneity, we ideally must
know the counterfactual, i.e. how the same farmers that suffered from harvest losses would have
decided in the lottery-based experiment, had they not experienced harvest shocks. We cannot use
an experiment to randomly introduce harvest shocks, so we need to another way to approach this
issue. We therefore present a propensity score matching (PSM) approach, as done similarly by
Said et al. (2015). As treatment variable, we use our loss dummy, indicating average harvest
losses of 25 percent from 2012-14, as stated in the previous section. We then create the
propensity score for by running a logit estimation on the binary treatment variable controlling for
all observable variables that might affect shock severity:
= + +                                (10)	
Here,  refers to the treatment status of individual  and 	refers to the individual specific error
term. The vector 	contains all of the variables that could determine treatment assignment, i.e.
whether one incurred a severe maize harvest loss. Here we include relevant sociodemographic
control variables as stated before and the following production variables: maize area, logged per
hectare expenditures for fertilizer, pesticides and herbicides, average total maize area 2012-14,
and the share of maize land devoted to improved maize varieties (Table A1 in the annex of this
chapter shows all the variables included). Conditioning on the propensity score, the preference
parameter outcomes are independent from treatment assignment (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008).
Kernel density estimates of the propensity score, i.e. predicted probability of belonging to the
treatment group based on observables (Figure A1 in the annex of this chapter) provide evidence
for common support. Each treated subject was matched with two untreated based on nearest
neighbor matching.
A further issue might arise because of potentially omitted variables, such as levels of precaution
or ability, which cause higher loss shares in maize, and are at the same time correlated with
uncertainty preferences. Therefore, in the absence of a control variable to capture precaution
levels, we might have a problem of reverse causality, meaning that existing uncertainty
preferences cause less precaution and thereby cause losses, rather than the other way around.
Precaution is unobserved and insufficiently approximated just by looking at input levels. To deal
with this potential source of endogeneity, we therefore additionally present an instrumental
48 Chapter III: The Relationship between Farmers’ Shock Experiences and
Uncertainty Preferences - Experimental Evidence from Mexico
variable (IV) approach.7 As IV, we use the village level averages of the farmers’ maize loss
percentages. The village averages can be regarded as exogenous in a sense that they only affect
an individual farmer’s preference parameters through his own experience of harvest losses, not
via unobservable factors such as his own level of precaution. Given a relatively large number of
observations per village, whether losses were high on the village level should be uninfluenced by
an individual farmers’ precaution or risk preferences. At the same time, it is hard to imagine that
there are other (unobservable) factors on the village level that affect both risk preferences and
harvest losses apart from exogenous shocks, so estimators can be expected to be consistent
(Angrist and Krueger 2001; Gormley and Matsa 2013). To create IV-based estimates, we first run
the following first stage OLS regression:
= + + +                                    (11)	
In equation (11),  refers to the harvest loss share 2012-14 of individual  from village , and
	refers to the individual specific error term. The IV 	is the average of  over all individuals
in the village . The linear predictions for harvest losses 	from equation (11) are then used in
the second stage, i.e. the ML estimation from equation (8). To correct the standard errors we
apply bootstrapping over the two stages.
The parameter estimation based on maximum likelihood as proposed by Harrison (2008) was
implemented in STATA13, with modifications to include ambiguity aversion and standard errors
clustered by subject. Those households that did not produce maize during all of the years 2012-14
for which data was collected were excluded. This reduces our sample size to 265 participating
farmers.
Results for sociodemographic characteristics7.
Descriptive results7.1
First, we give an overview of the sociodemographic characteristics of our participants (Table
III-7). The average respondent is around 47 years old. The sample is overwhelmingly male, with
only 8 percent being female, due to our respondents being farm decision makers, which is a
predominantly male responsibility. On average, respondents achieved relatively low levels of
7 To restrict the analysis on seemingly losses due to exogenous types of shocks such as self-reported drought losses is
not sufficient, as the severity of these shocks might be related to precaution or ability, too.
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formal education, with an average of 5.44 years. Only around 4 percent of the sample had an
indigenous parent. The sampled villages are on average rather remote, with an average travel
time to the nearest municipal capital of 80 minutes. As a proxy for wealth, we developed an asset
index based on principal component analysis. Unlike income, which measures a respondent’s
current economic position, an asset index looks at a respondent’s long-term economic status
(Filmer and Pritchett 2001). Our index incorporates and weights a list of owned household and
farm goods. The mean maize area over the three years prior to the survey is 2.66 ha. Of the total
land used to cultivate maize, the respondents devoted on average 56 percent to hybrid maize.
While 92 percent of respondent stated maize production to be their main income source, on
average they had a total of 4 income sources, which includes both farm and off-farm incomes.
Table III-7: Sociodemographic characteristics of participants
VARIABLE Mean SD
Education; years 5.44 3.79
Female; dummy 0.08 0.28
Asset index1 0.25 0.16
Household size 3.98 1.67
Producer age; years 46.76 14.15
Village reunions attended; share 0.55 0.43
Parents indigenous; dummy 0.04 0.21
No. of income sources 4.05 1.55
Time to city; minutes 80.12 42.17
Avg. maize area 2012-14; ha 2.66 1.81
Observations 265
1based on principal component analysis scores for one component and the following assets: TV,
concrete floor, fridge, cellphone, washing machine, separate bathroom inside/outside, draft animals,
tractor, maize degraining machine, transport vehicle, livestock.
Figure III-1: Distribution of switching rounds in lottery Series 3 and 4
Source: Authors‘ own illustration
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Figure III-1 gives some insights into the decisions during the lotteries and shows the distribution
of switching rounds between Series 3 and 4. The high frequency bars at the extremes show that a
large number of respondents either switched immediately or did not switch at all from Option A
to B, which corresponds to high degrees of risk aversion and/or non-linear probability weighting.
Estimation results7.2
Table III-8 shows the sample averages of the CPT parameters resulting from ML estimation
without including covariates. We can strongly reject that our subjects are expected utility
maximizers, which would imply neither probability weighting nor loss aversion, i.e. = = 1.
However, we do find significant loss aversion, non-linear probability weighting, concave value
function curvature and, with a coefficient of 0.94, a slight tendency towards ambiguity loving
preferences (Chi-square test p-values<0.00).
Table III-8: CPT coefficients using maximum likelihood estimation
PARAMETER
Value function curvature; 0.490*** (18.82)
Loss aversion; 2.406*** (19.52)
Probability weighting; 0.777*** (32.05)




* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. t statistics in parenthesis.
Table III-9 shows the results of the ML estimation of the parameters controlling for
sociodemographic variables. When looking at specific variables we find that we can help build
toward the consensus that previous researchers have started. An increase of the value function
curvature  in the interval [0,1] means decreasing concavity and therefore, less risk aversion. Our
results show that higher levels of education are related to lower levels of risk aversion. This is in
contrast to the results from Tanaka et al. (2010) but in line with both the samples of Gloede et al.
(2015). Risk aversion increases with household size, which is in contrast to the finding by Miyata
et al. (2003). This difference could be due to the fact that our subjects were almost invariably
household heads. Instead of a larger household representing a safety net as argued by Miyata et
al. (2003), from the perspective of the head a larger household might imply a larger responsibility
burden and therefore a more considerate and risk-averse behavior. Subjects with indigenous
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parents were on average significantly more risk averse, as were those with a more diversified
income.
An increase in the loss aversion parameter  for any value of > 1 is associated with an increase
in loss aversion. We find that the number of people living in one’s household is related to higher
levels of loss aversion, which is consistent with previous findings and could be explained
similarly  to  the  higher  degree  of  risk  aversion  amongst  heads  of  larger  households.  More














Education; years 0.026*** -0.079** 0.003 0.003
(3.92) (-2.17) (0.54) (0.49)
Female; dummy 0.122 0.441 0.073 0.037
(1.27) (0.88) (0.95) (0.58)
Asset index1 0.102 -0.959 0.344** -0.039
(0.51) (-1.40) (2.45) (-0.41)
Household size -0.026** 0.266*** -0.005 -0.005
(-2.01) (2.58) (-0.34) (-0.33)
Producer age; years 0.003** 0.005 0.002 -0.002
(2.11) (0.45) (1.12) (-0.79)
Village reunions attended; share 0.062 -0.216 -0.069 0.034
(0.85) (-0.71) (-1.16) (0.61)
Parents indigenous; dummy -0.270*** -0.213 0.048 -0.859***
(-4.88) (-0.11) (0.13) (-10.38)
No. of income sources -0.026** -0.102 -0.004 0.019
(-2.36) (-1.25) (-0.21) (1.30)
Time to city; minutes 0.000 -0.001 0.001** -0.001
(0.33) (-0.32) (2.03) (-1.01)
Constant 0.311* 2.559*** 0.527*** 0.998***





Prob > Chi2 0.012
Wald Chi2(9) 21.05
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. t statistics in parenthesis.
1based on principal component analysis scores for one component and the following assets: TV, concrete floor, fridge, cellphone, washing
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education is associated with less loss aversion. We could not find any other study in the literature
that could make a significant connection between loss aversion and household size.
A reduction in the probability weighting coefficient  in the interval [0,1] denotes an increase in
overweighting of small probabilities and de-weighting of large probabilities. Hence, we find that
probability overweighting is decreasing in wealth and distance to the nearest city. We do not find
a significant relationship between probability weighting and any of the other sociodemographic
variables.
Looking at the ambiguity aversion coefficient θ , an increase in the interval [0,1] means a
decrease in ambiguity loving preference towards ambiguity neutrality, while an increase in the
interval [1,θ] denotes an increase in ambiguity aversion. However, we only find significantly
higher ambiguity aversion for subjects with an indigenous parent. Unlike Engle-Warnick et al.
(2011) we find no significant effect of household size. All in all, hence, we cannot reject
hypothesis H1, that sociodemographic characteristics explain variation in the CPT parameters
and ambiguity aversion, while the direction of influence is only partly in line with past studies.
Results for harvest loss experiences8.
Descriptive results8.1
Table III-11 presents descriptive statistics on subjects’ maize shock frequency and severity
experienced from 2012-14. During those years, the average respondent suffered from 1.77
incidents in which maize harvest was lost. Drought accounted for 51 percent of the total losses,
followed by excessive rain (20 percent) and pest shocks (14 percent). Those farmers that
experienced harvest shocks, lost on average 19 percent of their harvest in the incident.
Table III-11: Summary statistics of maize losses
Mean SD
No. of losses 2012-14 1.79 (1.00)
Average yearly losses 2012-14; % of harvest1 18.74 (24.27)
Average loss ≥25%; dummy 0.21 -
Loss to drought; % of total maize loss 51.19 -
Loss to rain; % of total maize loss 20.06 -
Loss to pest; % of total maize loss 13.61 -
Loss to wind; % of total maize loss 4.89 -
Loss to other; % of total maize loss 10.25 -
Observations 265
1Given a loss occurred
53Chapter III: The Relationship between Farmers’ Shock Experiences and
Uncertainty Preferences - Experimental Evidence from Mexico
Estimation results8.2
Table III-12 shows the results of the ML estimation of the CPT parameters controlling for the
average severity of maize losses in 2012-14, expressed either as average loss percentages or as a
dummy for an average harvest loss of over 25 percent. In all specifications we control for
sociodemographic variables. In columns 1 and 2 we can infer from both the continuous and the
dummy variable that subjects who experienced a larger loss severity in 2012-14 do not score
significantly differently on parameters of the value function curvature ( ),  loss  aversion  ( ), or
ambiguity aversion ( ). Even though not significant, the sign on  is positive which suggests a
tendency of increased loss aversion after more severe loss experiences as proposed by Barberis et
al. (2001). However, we do find a significant relationship with maize loss severity and the
increased overweighting of small probabilities, corresponding to a negative coefficient on the
probability weighting coefficient . This result is in line with Li et al. (2011) who also find that
subjects overweighted small probabilities after a shock and in contrast to Reynaud and Aubert
(2013) who find no such effect for flood loss experiences. Li et al. (2011) argue that experiencing
a low-probability disaster may cause an overestimation of the frequency of low probability events
in general through the availability and representative heuristics that subjects follow (Tversky and
Kahneman 1974).
As argued before, to deal with potential endogeneity, we extend our analysis by a propensity
score matching (PSM) and an instrumental variable (IV) approach laid out in the following. In
order to assess whether a matching approach is justified, we check for the balance of covariates in
the control and treatment group, i.e. the group of farmers with average loss shares of over 25
percent between 2012-14 before matching. Indeed, we find some significant differences in
fertilizer and herbicide expenditures per hectare, as well as total maize area (Table A1 in the
annex of this chapter). However, t-tests on the explanatory variables after matching indicate that
balance  on  observables  was  achieved  (Table  A2  in  the  annex  of  this  chapter).  Results  for
propensity score matched data are presented in column 3 of Table III-12. The treatment dummy,
i.e. having incurred average maize loss shares above 25 percent in 2012-14, shows up
significantly negative in explaining probability weighting. This confirms our results from the
non-matched data, finding that shock severity increased probability weighting. However, when
looking at the coefficient of the shock dummy variable in estimating the value function curvature,
we find a significant negative treatment effect. This means that when comparing subjects with the
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Table III-12: Effect of losses on CPT parameters using maximum likelihood estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-IV Non-IV PSM IV
Value function curvature ( )
Loss; % 0.001 -0.014**
(1.40) (-2.29)
Loss≥25%; dummy 0.005 -0.090**
(0.14) (-2.10)
Constant 0.590*** 0.583*** 0.427*** 0.489***
(5.77) (5.64) (6.03) (2.82)
Loss aversion ( )
Loss; % 0.001 0.074
(0.09) (1.48)
Loss≥25%; dummy 0.446 0.360
(1.31) (0.96)
Constant 2.540*** 2.584*** 2.912*** 2.389**
(3.19) (3.22) (6.21) (2.19)
Probability weighting ( )
Loss; % -0.003*** -0.022**
(-3.09) (-2.53)
Loss≥25%; dummy -0.133** -0.115*
(-2.26) (-1.91)
Constant 0.351** 0.342** 0.890*** 0.247
(2.15) (2.09) (12.64) (1.03)
Ambiguity aversion ( )
Loss; % 0.000 -0.006
(0.14) (-0.79)
Loss≥25%; dummy -0.006 -0.031
(-0.11) (-0.57)
Constant 0.930*** 0.933*** 0.912*** 0.902***
(6.21) (6.23) (14.26) (5.56)
Noise; constant 0.631*** 0.630*** 0.515*** 0.638***
(9.55) (9.64) (9.53) (9.59)
Socio-demographics1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15,105 15,105 9,405 15,105
Cluster 265 265 165 265
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.003 0.093 0.059
Wald Chi2 31.63 26.50 4.75 16.37
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. t statistics in parenthesis.
Model (3): Propensity score matched data. Treatment: Loss≥25%=1. Each treated was matched with two untreated
observations based on nearest neighbor matching.
Model (4): IV Estimation. IV=village level average of respective loss variable. Standard errors were bootstrapped with 100
repetitions.
1Model (3): Propensity score
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same probabilities to incur severe maize losses as predicted by their sociodemographic and
production characteristics, subjects that actually suffered severe maize losses are more risk
averse. This result is in line with Reynaud and Aubert (2013) and Cameron and Shaw (2015) who
report higher risk aversion for individuals that experienced natural disaster related shocks and
points towards the risk vulnerability hypothesis (Gollier and Pratt 1996).
Regarding the IV results, the validity of our instrument is confirmed in the first stage regression
(Table A3 in the annex of this chapter), confirming a strong correlation between the instrument,
village average loss shares, and our variable of interest, individual loss severity. In the IV-
estimation results are presented in column 4 of Table III-12. The instrumented loss percentages,
i.e. the variation in shock severity that is explained exogenously, shows up significantly
negatively in explaining probability weighting. This confirms our results from before, finding
that shock severity increases the overweighting of small probabilities. When looking at the
coefficient of the instrumented loss shares for the value function curvature, we find a negative
significant coefficient for loss percentage. This denotes an increase in risk aversion following
larger maize harvest loss shares and is in line with the PSM results. For loss aversion and
ambiguity aversion, we find no significant effects.
Conclusion9.
Starting with Binswanger (1980), economists have been trying to understand how smallholder
farmers make decisions under uncertainty. Also, previous authors have tried to work towards an
understanding of the relationship between the experience of shocks and risk preferences, but have
not been able to come to a consensus. This paper helps to further the at times hazy understanding
of the role of shock experience on uncertainty preferences. Not only do we add to the literature
surrounding the effects of shocks, in our case maize harvest shocks, on risk aversion only, we use
Cumulative Prospect Theory and additionally estimate ambiguity aversion, i.e. aversion to
uncertainty  over  the  probabilities  of  a  risky  payout.  To  do  so  we  used  a  lab-in-the-field
experiment conducted with smallholder maize farmers in Chiapas, Mexico, and furthermore
collected data on sociodemographic characteristics, agricultural production and maize harvest
losses.  Our  results  show  a  strong  rejection  of  Expected  Utility  Theory  in  favor  of  Cumulative
Prospect Theory. We find significant probability weighting, risk and loss aversion amongst our
sample, and to a weaker degree, ambiguity aversion.
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Our results are notable because they allow for conclusions regarding the effects of
sociodemographic variables and harvest loss experiences beyond just risk aversion. First, we use
a wide range of sociodemographic variables to explain parameters of risk aversion, loss aversion,
probability weighting and ambiguity aversion. Coefficients are partially in line with the existing
literature. Most notably, subjects from richer households displayed less overweighting of small
probabilities, while subjects from larger households were more risk and loss averse. Farmers with
more diversified on- and off-farm income sources were on average more risk averse. Subjects
from indigenous families were more risk and also more ambiguity averse, while ambiguity
aversion was not significantly related to any other sociodemographic factor. Second, using
propensity score matching and an instrumental variable approach to control for potential
endogeneity of harvest loss severity, we find that farmers having experienced more severe losses
become more risk averse, more strongly overweight small, and underweight large probabilities.
No such effect is found on loss aversion or ambiguity aversion.
If farmers become more risk averse in the aftermath of experiencing shocks, this could well affect
their future investment and technology adoption behavior, potentially making them more hesitant
to engage in risky but productivity enhancing practices. Additionally, the more severe the
experienced harvest losses, the more distorted becomes the farmers’ assessment of low
probabilities and the likelihood of future shock may be overestimated. The risk of shocks by itself
is already considered a driver of persistent poverty; if the occurrence of shocks furthermore
causes preferences to change endogenously towards risk avoidance, they might furthermore lead
to “behavioral poverty traps” (Barrett and Carter 2013). Before this background, it is not
encouraging that weather shocks with adverse impacts on harvests are likely to further increase.
Taken all together, as stressed by the World Bank (2013), this makes the case for policies
facilitating risk management, disaster relief and safety nets in poor rural regions even stronger.
The Mexican catastrophic risk management program CADENA that reinsures municipalities
providing emergency assistance to farmers (Cabestany-Noriega et al. 2013) is certainly a step in
the  right  direction.  Farmers  in  our  sample  so  far  did  not  benefit  from  this  governmental
assistance, for which it is of vital importance to ensure that in the future also more remotely
located smallholder farmers will be reached.
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Annex
Table A1: Balance of covariates by loss affected status before propensity score matching
Treatment1 Control
VARIABLE Mean SD Mean  SD p2
Education; years 5.49 3.84 5.27 3.64 0.71
Female; dummy 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.29 0.81
Asset index3 0.25 0.15 0.27 0.17 0.36
Household size 3.92 1.60 4.22 1.92 0.24
Producer age; years 46.23 13.97 48.67 14.78 0.25
Village reunions attended; share 0.59 0.42 0.52 0.46 0.27
Parents indigenous; dummy 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.23 0.72
No. of income sources 3.97 1.51 4.35 1.65 0.11
Time to city; minutes 81.70 41.93 74.09 42.90 0.23
Avg. maize area 2012-14; ha 2.57 1.60 3.02 2.45 0.10*
Log. fertilizer expenditure; $MXN/ha 7.69 1.08 7.97 1.25 0.09*
Log. pesticide expenditure; $MXN/ha 2.69 2.36 3.34 2.37 0.07*
Log. herbicide expenditure; $MXN/ha 6.42 1.02 6.39 1.37 0.89
Land with hybrid maize 2012-14; share 0.57 0.44 0.53 0.34 0.60
Observations 210 55
1Treatment refers to subjects with average maize loss shares 2012-14 above the 80 th percentile of the sample distribution, which corresponds to
a loss≥25%.
2p-values from two-sided t-test. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
3based on principal component analysis scores for one component and the following assets: TV, concrete floor, fridge, cellphone, washing
machine, separate bathroom inside/outside, draft animals, tractor, maize degraining machine, transport vehicle, livestock.
Table A2: Balance of covariates by loss affected status after propensity score matching
Control Treatment1
VARIABLE Mean SD Mean  SD p2
Education; years 5.27 3.45 5.27 3.64 1.00
Female; dummy 0.08 0.28 0.09 0.29 0.84
Asset index3 0.28 0.17 0.27 0.17 0.79
Household size 4.23 1.97 4.22 1.92 0.98
Producer age; years 48.98 13.70 48.67 14.78 0.89
Village reunions attended; share 0.37 0.42 0.46 0.46 0.21
Parents indigenous; dummy 0.02 0.13 0.05 0.23 0.20
No. of income sources 3.95 1.45 4.35 1.65 0.12
Time to city; minutes 2.61 1.75 3.02 2.45 0.22
Avg. maize area 2012-14; ha 7.81 1.23 7.97 1.25 0.41
Log. fertilizer expenditure; $MXN/ha 3.61 2.09 3.34 2.37 0.46
Log. pesticide expenditure; $MXN/ha 6.26 0.89 6.39 1.37 0.46
Log. herbicide expenditure; $MXN/ha 0.51 0.45 0.53 0.34 0.70
Land with hybrid maize 2012-14; share 73.33 36.63 74.09 42.90 0.91
Observations 110 55
1propensity score matched data. Treatment refers to subjects with average maize loss shares 2012-14 above the 80 th percentile of the sample
distribution, which corresponds to a loss≥25%. Each treated was matched with two untreated observations based on  nearest neighbor matching.
2p-values from two-sided t-test. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
3based on principal component analysis scores for one component and the following assets: TV, concrete floor, fridge, cellphone, washing
machine, separate bathroom inside/outside, draft animals, tractor, maize degraining machine, transport vehicle, livestock.
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Table A3: First stage OLS regression
VARIABLES







                                                            * p < 0.1,** p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01. t statistics in parentheses.
                                       Dependent variable=farmers’ share of harvest lost, 2012-14; %
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IV Formal Insurance, Risk Sharing, and the Dynamics of Other-
Regarding Preferences8
Abstract
In the absence of formal financial markets many poor households rely on the mutual exchange
within informal risk sharing networks to protect themselves against adverse events. Social
interactions in the aftermath of shocks have been found to strengthen the social ties among
members of such networks. In this paper, we analyze how selectively providing formal insurance
to  members  of  a  risk  sharing  network  affects  risk  sharing  transfers  and,  subsequently,  the
dynamics of other-regarding preferences. In a framed field experiment, we find that the effect of
formal insurance depends on (1) the covariance structure of shocks and (2) on the individual
insurance status. When formal insurance is available to some members of a risk sharing network,
it either decreases trust levels of the uninsured or increases trust levels of the insured subjects
towards the other network members, depending on the degree of income covariance within the
network. Trustworthiness and altruism remain unaffected by the introduction of insurance. The
results are driven by a change in the dynamics of the transfer behavior within the network
induced by formal insurance.
JEL Classifications: D64; A13; C91; D81
Keywords: altruism; risk sharing; social preferences; insurance
8This chapter is co-authored by Stephan Dietrich, Marcela Ibañez, and Oliver Musshoff. The authors’ contributions
are as follows: SD, MI and HF designed the research. MI developed the theoretical model. HF contributed to the
model design and collected the data. HF and SD analyzed and interpreted the data. HF, SD, MI and OM wrote the
manuscript.
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Introduction1.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the interlink between risk sharing in informal solidarity
networks, formal insurance, and the dynamics of other-regarding preferences. Other-regarding
preferences, also referred to as social preferences, are the preferences of individuals over the
well-being of others, additionally to their own (Camerer et al. 2011; Kagel and Roth 1995). They
allow explaining decisions in various circumstances ranging from charitable behavior, bequests,
contributions to public goods, and investment decisions (Cooper and Kagel 2016). Understanding
the factors that affect the development of other-regarding preferences is important since societies
that manage to establish norms that curb individualistic interest in favor of social well-being have
been found to experience higher economic growth (Cardenas and Carpenter 2008; Zak and Knack
2001).
Providing formal, individualized insurance to previously uninsured households in developing
countries is regarded as a promising instrument to decrease vulnerability to poverty (World Bank
2013): it has been argued that the risk reduction due to formal insurance could lead farmers to
invest in more risky, but higher yielding technologies (Fafchamps 2010; Karlan et al. 2014),
improve access to loans (Giné and Yang 2009) and prevent the use of inefficient risk coping
mechanisms (Barnett et al. 2008; Dercon 2002; Fafchamps and Gubert 2007; Fafchamps and
Lund 2003). Yet, theoretical and empirical literature suggests that formal insurance can crowd-
out risk sharing in informal solidarity networks, potentially resulting in a net decrease in risk
coverage (Lin et al. 2014). Apart from increasing households’ vulnerability to adverse shocks,
this could have negative effects on the development of other-regarding preferences among
households. We present a model that explains the development of these preferences in informal
risk sharing agreements with imperfect commitment. Other-regarding preferences are formalized
as the weight the network partners’ income has in one’s own utility function. Similar to van Dijk
and van Winden (1997), these weights are not constant over time but depend on the history of the
interaction between individuals. As individuals who are affected by negative shocks receive
transfers from their social network, they increase the weight that they attach to the utility of those
others. Therefore, even when there is no infinite repeated interaction, positive levels of risk
sharing can be achieved (Coate and Ravallion 1993; Foster and Rosenzweig 2001; Ligon et al.
2002). We extend this model by taking into account the impact of formal insurance on risk
sharing.  Similar to Lin et  al.  (2014),  we are able to show that formal insurance crowds-out risk
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sharing under some circumstances. We show that this can also result in a subsequent crowding-
out of the development of other-regarding preferences.
To test the above hypotheses, we implemented a framed field experiment (Harrison and List
2004) in rural Mexico where households, mainly relying on agricultural activities for their
income, are particularly vulnerable to weather shocks and exposed to a large amount of uninsured
risks.  It  could  be  shown  that  natural  disasters  are  a  significant  driver  of  poverty  dynamics  in
Mexico (Rodriguez-Oreggia et al. 2013). In an effort to reduce this vulnerability, the Mexican
government has invested in the development of a subsidized federal insurance scheme for farmers
(Cabestany-Noriega et al. 2013). Public expenses to promote formal agricultural insurance
schemes have almost doubled between 2007 and 2010. In 2011, 2.67 million hectares of
agricultural land - however mainly located in the more developed regions - were covered. By
strengthening the insurance markets, many small-scale farmers could get access to formal
insurance, which could have important implications for the dynamics of other-regarding
preferences within communities. Moreover, the implications could be especially severe for those
left uninsured; typically, these are the poorest households who are less likely to buy insurance
(Eling et al. 2014).
Our experimental design is similar to van Dijk et al.’s (2002) three-stage design. In the first stage
we elicit experimental measures of social preferences using a three-person dictator and trust
game. Thereafter, we allow participants to interact in a three-person, repeated solidarity game
similar to Selten and Ockenfels (1998). After solving a real effort task, participants can suffer
from  a  negative  shock  which  results  in  total  loss  of  their  earnings.  Participants  who  are  not
affected by the shock can decide to send a transfer to affected participants. In this stage we
exogenously modify (1) the number of participants simultaneously affected by a shock and (2)
the availability of insurance. We allow for either one individual being affected by a shock at a
time, which we will refer to as “individual shock” and corresponds to a negative income
correlation, or two, which we will refer to as “collective shock” and corresponds to positive
income correlation. In the treatments with insurance, two participants in the network are
exogenously provided with fair insurance, while the third individual remains exposed to negative
shocks. Insured participants receive a fixed payment independently of whether they are affected
by a shock or not and therefore can send transfers to the shock-affected member. Finally, in the
last stage we repeat the measurement of social preferences using a three-person dictator and trust
67Chapter IV: Formal Insurance, Risk Sharing, and the Dynamics of Other-
Regarding Preferences
game  with  the  same  three-person  groups  from  the  solidarity  game.  The  comparison  of  the
experimental measures before and after the solidarity game under different treatments allows
tracing the dynamics of social preferences.
We find partial support for the model. The history of previous interactions in the solidarity game
does affect the development of other-regarding preferences. Participants that are insured and
therefore receive no transfers from their network in the solidarity game, display less trust towards
the other network members than in the control treatment without insurance. Conversely,
participants who are not insured and receive transfers from insured participants, display higher
levels of trust. Our results, however, provide limited support for the crowding-out effects of the
insurance on average informal risk sharing. We find that average transfers to non-insured
network members do not change significantly when some members are insured and shocks are
individual. When shocks are collective, insurance has a positive effect on the absolute value of
the transfers received by non-insured network members, but a negative effect on the value of
transfers received relative to the maximum amount possible. These results suggest that when
formal insurance is introduced, the effects on other-regarding preferences are driven by the
structure of the shocks, or covariance of incomes within the network.
Few theoretical models explain the existence of risk sharing agreements with imperfect
commitment (Charness and Genicot 2009; Coate and Ravallion 1993; Foster and Rosenzweig
2001; Kimball 1988; Ligon et al. 2002). Yet, the only paper that considers the crowding-out
effects of formal insurance on risk sharing is Lin et al. (2014). Following an approach similar to
Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) and Lin et al. (2014), we propose a model of risk sharing with
other-regarding preferences. Previously, van Dijk and van Winden (1997) and van Dijk et al.
(2002) also examined the effect of interaction in public goods games on other-regarding
preferences. Yet, we differ from these papers as we are the first to explicitly examine the effect of
risk sharing with and without formal insurance on the development of other-regarding
preferences.
There is a growing literature examining the interrelation between formal insurance and risk
sharing networks (Cecchi et al. 2016; Dercon et al. 2014; Landmann et al. 2012; Lenel and
Steiner 2016; Lin et al. 2014; Mobarak and Rosenzweig 2013). For example, Mobarak and
Rosenzweig (2013) study how the existence of risk sharing agreements affects the demand for
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formal insurance. Similar to Dercon et al. (2014) and Lin et al. (2014), we take into account
potential crowding-out effects of formal insurance on informal risk sharing. On the one hand,
Dercon et al. (2014) show theoretically and empirically that basis risk, the risk of suffering a loss
that is not indemnified by index-based insurance, can crowd-in informal transfers in risk sharing
networks. On the other hand, Lin et al. (2014) show theoretically and empirically that formal
insurance can crowd-out transfers in informal risk sharing networks. First, the utility of remaining
in autarky relative to participating in the network increases. Second, formal insurance is a
substitute for informal transfers and decreases the marginal utility of those. Similarly, Landmann
et al. (2012) find that formal insurance crowds-out solidarity between network members when
incomes are observable, and that this effect even persists after removing the insurance. In contrast
to  these  studies,  our  focus  lies  on  the  effect  of  formal  insurance  on  the  dynamics  of  other-
regarding preferences.
A similar approach to our research is the work by Cecchi et al. (2016) who analyze how the
introduction of formal health insurance in Uganda affects public goods contributions. The authors
find a reduction in public goods contributions in areas where insurance had been introduced. The
effect is driven by lower contributions of individuals that did not take up insurance. Our work
complements this research by analyzing the effects of formal insurance depending on the
covariance structure of shocks. In particular, we separately consider the cases when negative
income shocks affect either one or more than one network member simultaneously. This is
important as the dynamics of the exchange of help and other-regarding preferences can change
significantly depending on the structure of shocks (Dietrich 2013).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model explaining
the crowding-out effects of insurance on transfers within risk sharing models. Section 3 and 4
explain the experiment design, treatments, and experimental procedures. Section 5 describes the




We propose a risk sharing model in the spirit of well-established models of risk sharing under no
or imperfect commitment (Coate and Ravallion 1993; Foster and Rosenzweig 2001; Ligon et al.
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2002). Specifically, a solidarity network with altruistic preferences similar to Lin et al. (2014) is
considered, composed of three individuals, = 1,2,3. They interact over two periods	 = 1,2. In
each period individual  receives an income yi,t( , ), where  is the state of the world that
individual  confronts in period . There are two possible states, , = 1  or , = 2 . The
probabilities associated with each of these are (1− ) and , respectively. Similar to other risk-
sharing models (Foster and Rosenzweig 2001; Lin et al. 2014), we assume that individuals cannot
save across periods. Income is given by:
, =
, + , 						 	 , = 1
, 																						 	 , = 2
(1)
 is a fixed income and 	an additional positive income only attained if , = 1 ,  while  a
negative income shock corresponds to , = 2 .  Individuals  can  send  transfers  to  network
members that are affected by a shock ( 	= 2). We denote the transfer sent by individual  to the
affected individual(s)  in period  by , . We assume that transfers are only sent if at least one
member in the network is affected by a shock, and that affected members cannot send transfers.
Then a transfer from  to  occurs if , = 1 and 	 , = 2	for all ≠ .
We  assume  that  individuals’  utility  depends  on  two  components:  (1)  the  utility  of  their  own
consumption and (2) utility of consumption of the other network members. Thereby we take into
account that transfers can be motivated by an altruistic motive (Cox et al. 2008; Foster and
Rosenzweig 2001; Lin et al. 2014). The utility of consumption ( , )  is  assumed  to  be  a
standard von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function that is increasing and concave in ( ′( ) >
0, "( ) < 0). In period , individual 	attaches a welfare weight ,  to their partner ’s utility of
consumption, ( , ), with ′( ) > 0 and "( ) < 0 . Following the standard assumptions we
define 0 < 	 , < 1, ruling out that  values 's utility of consumption more than her own.
Our innovation is that we extend this model by considering that the welfare weight 	 ,  is
dynamic.  Therefore  we  follow  the  notion  suggested  by  Bault  et  al.  (2016),  who  model  the
development of other-regarding preferences among individuals as depending on the degree of
positive or negative valuation of their interaction experiences. Within a risk sharing network, we
suggest that an interaction is valued more positively when higher risk sharing transfers are
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received. Therefore, the welfare weight 	 ,  changes  over  time  with  the  history  of  previous
transfers received by  from , , ,  and  the  previous  level  of  altruism, 	 , .  Dynamics  of
other-regarding preferences are given by a function 	 , = ( , , 	 , ) , where 	 ,  is
increasing in transfers received in , , ( 	 ,
,
> 0), and increases more for initially less altruistic
individuals, ( 	 ,
, 	 ,
< 0). For simplicity, we assume that the discount rate is equal to one and
future consumption is valued as much as present consumption.
We consider two different scenarios which we refer to as individual and collective shocks. In the
scenario with individual shocks, incomes of the network members are negatively correlated and
therefore only one network member is affected by a negative income shock in a given period.
Hence, if a shock occurs, then , = 2 for  and , = 1 for all ≠ . Under this scenario, two
participants in the network can make a transfer to the affected member at a given time. In the
scenario with collective shocks, incomes of the network members are positively correlated and
two network members are affected by a negative income shock in a given period. In this case,
, = 1 for  and , = 2 for all ≠  and only one network member can make a transfer at a
time. Each shock-affected member will receive half of that transfer.
Individual shocks2.2
2.2.1 Optimization problem
We first consider the scenario with individual shocks, in which participant  suffers an income
shock and individual  (and ) can make a transfer to them. Assuming that an individual’s utility
is separable in two components - own consumption and weighted consumption of others in the
network, the optimization problem for individual  in = 1 is:
,
			 , , , , , , = , + , ( , ) + , ( , ) (2)
Subject to:
, + , = , + , (3)
, − , − , = , (4)
, + , = , + , (5)
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																												 , , , , , , + , +1 , +1, , +1, , +1 																																																					
≥ , , , , , , + , +1 , +1, , +1, , +1 																																																			(6)
Equations (3) to (5) refer to the budget constraints for individuals	 , , and , while equation (6)
refers to the participation constraint in the risk sharing network. This condition simply states that
individual  would decide to participate in the risk sharing network and make a transfer if the
discounted expected utility after the transfer is larger than the expected utility in autarky, i.e.
without current or future exchange of transfers. The discounted expected utility of participating in
the network, , +1, depends on the expected probabilities of the different states of the world
that  could be confronted with in + 1 . Denoting the set of states for the world by =
{si,t , sj,t , sk,t} , the following sets of states are possible: = {1,2,1} + {1,1,2} ; = {1,2,2} ;
= {2,1,1}; = {	2,2,1} + {2,1,2}; = {2,2,2} and = {1,1,1}. Let  to  represent the
probabilities of the different sets of states.9 The expected utility of consumption in = 2 is given
by the expected utility of different states of the world:
, =
, + , − , + , , + , + , + , ,
+ , + , − , + 2 , , +
,
2
+ , + , + , + , , + , − , + , ,
+ , +
,
2 + , , + , − , + , , +
,
2
+ , + , , + , ,
+(1 − − − − − ) , + , + , , + , + , , + ,     (7)
Here, the value of the transfer received by  tomorrow, , , is a function of the welfare weight
or degree of altruism  from  to , which increases with the transfers sent by  to  today, , . For
a finite interaction over two periods, the problem can be solved recursively, finding the optimal
transfer in = 2 first, and then finding the optimal transfer in = 1. In = 2, the participation
9Assuming that the probability of a shock,	 , is the same for all , then = 2 (1− ) ; 	 = (1 − ); 	 =
(1− ) ; 	 = 2 (1 − ); and = . Hence, (1 − − − − − ) = (1− ) .
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constraint is not binding. Assuming that ,  is independent from , , the first order condition for
an interior solution implies that a transfer will be sent if:




This implies that when the welfare weight, , , is higher than the threshold level , , risk
sharing can be achieved in the absence of repeated interaction. However, in = 1, transfers can
occur even if the welfare weight is below the threshold level. This happens when the participation
constraint in the risk sharing network is binding. The participation constraint states that
participants’ expected utility of participating in the risk sharing a network and making a transfer
today is larger than the expected utility in autarky, i.e. without any exchange of transfers. If this is
the case, transfers are positive even when , < ̅ , . Comparative statics around the optimum
transfer , ∗ for = 1,2 lead to the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Optimal transfer
The optimal transfer increases with (1) the level of altruism or welfare weight, , ,
(2) 's income, , + , , and (3) the probability of attaining a low income state, .
Proof: see annex of this chapter.
We extend this model furthermore by introducing formal insurance. We consider a scenario in
which only two members of the network  and  have access to fair insurance. In this model we
do not attempt to explain the decision to insure, but assume that insurance is exogenously
assigned. This could for instance reflect a social protection program that just reaches some
individuals within a community. Insured network members are insured for all two periods. We
consider fair insurance that costs ℎ each period and pays ℎ when , = 2. In order to analyze
the crowding-out effect of insurance, we must distinguish three cases:
2.2.2 Case A: Non-insured participant sends transfer to insured participant
When a non-insured participant  makes a transfer to an insured participant , the first order
condition for optimization of the non-insured participant is
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,
= (1 + )(− , + , − , + , ′ , + (1 − )ℎ + , + , ) 	+
, + , + , − , , + , − ℎ − , +
, +





]            (9)
where  is the Lagrangian multiplier which is assumed to be larger than zero when the
participation constraint is binding, and equal to zero otherwise. The first line of equation (9)
above refers to the marginal net benefit of sending a transfer today, while the second and third
lines  of  the  expression  refer  to  the  future  expected  utility  gains  of  sending  a  transfer  today.  As
participant  sends a larger transfer to  in = 1 ,  the  welfare  weight  of  towards , , ,
increases in = 2 . This implies that if individual  is  hit  by  a  shock  in = 2 , transfers
, 	from  to  will be larger. This effect is captured by the last term of the last line in equation
(9).  The  change  in  utility  depends  on  the  increased  marginal  utility  of  own  consumption  from
receiving a transfer, indicated first part of the second and third line in equation (9), versus the
decreased weighted marginal utility of consumption of , indicated in the second part of the
second and third lines, respectively.
The introduction of insurance induces a substitution effect. When  receives an indemnity
payment, ℎ, the marginal utility of additionally receiving a transfer is lower, which  takes into
account when determining her own optimal transfer level and therefore reduces it accordingly.
The insurance also generates an income effect. When the insured participant pays ℎ for the
insurance in + 1, he is relatively poorer compared to the scenario without insurance. This
increases the marginal cost of a transfer from  to  in + 1. Knowing that  is insured and
expecting less transfers from  in + 1 when experiencing a negative income shock,  anticipates
this effect and sends less transfers to  in = 1. The substitution and the income effect result in a
lower , . This also crowds-out the development of other-regarding preferences amongst  and .
As  receives lower transfers from , her level of attachment towards  is also reduced when
insurance is available compared to when it is not.
2.2.3 Case B: Insured participant sends transfer to non-insured participant
When participant  is insured, while she can still send transfers to affected participants, we
assume that she cannot receive transfers in + 1,  since  she  will  get  an  indemnity  payment  of
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(1 − )ℎ when she suffered a shock. Therefore, = = 0. This reduces ’s incentive to send a
transfer to  in . The first order condition for optimization for  is:
,
= (1 + ) − ′ , + , − , − ℎ + ,
′
, + , + , (10)
The effect of insurance is to decrease ’s disposable income in = 1 , which increases ’s
marginal cost of sending a transfer to the uninsured participant  and therefore decreases , .
Besides, the insurance changes the participation constraint. As  knows she is insured in case of a
shock in + 1  and will receive an indemnity payment (1− )ℎ , the marginal utility of
(additionally) receiving transfers from  is lower. This reduces ’s incentive to make transfers
today and crowds out , .
2.2.4 Case C: Insured participant sends transfer to insured participant
In this case, the first order condition for optimization of the insured participant in the network is:
,
= (1 + ) − ′ + , − , − ℎ + ,
′
, + , + , + (1− )ℎ        (11)
In this case, the effects of insurance are the following: insurance decreases disposable income of
in , so transfers become costlier (income effect). Because  also has insurance, the marginal
benefit of her receiving a transfer is lower. Since  cannot expect to receive transfers in + 1, ’s
incentive to make a transfer in  are additionally reduced (change in the participation constraint).
In conclusion, in all three cases we observe that introducing insurance to the risk sharing network
results in a crowding-out effect on the value of the transfer in = 1. This generates an indirect
effect on the dynamics of other-regarding preferences. The welfare weights in + 1 are therefore




The above model can be modified in order to consider the scenario in which shocks are collective
and two members of the network are affected by a shock in a given period. Similar as before we
first look at the case where there is no insurance available and then compare it to the scenario in
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which it is. As before, insurance is assigned exogenously and we do not model the decision to
become insured.
In the scenario with collective shocks, we assume that the individual who is not affected by a
shock, , decides in = 1 on the optimal level of transfer ,  to the two network members  and
 affected by a shock. This transfer is equally shared among  and 	and each of them receives
, . We further consider that the welfare weight is the same for  and  in , , = , . Under
the scenario with collective shocks, the budget restrictions for each of the network members are:
, + , = + , (12)
, − , /2 = , (13)
, − , /2 = , (14)
The participation constraint and the expected utility of participating in + 1 the network remain
unchanged as in equations (6) and (7).
As with individual shocks, we can consider three different scenarios regarding the effect of the
insurance on transfers. We explain each scenario separately below.
2.3.2 Case D: Non-insured participant sends transfer to two insured participants
The first order condition for optimization of the non-insured participant  in the network is:
,
=
(1 + ) − , + , − , + , 2 , + (1 − )ℎ +
, 	+ 2 , +
2 , − , 2 , + , − ℎ − , + , +
, −
, , + , − ℎ − , +




,                                                    (15)
As the shock-affected network member  is insured and receives an indemnity payment (1− )ℎ
in , the marginal utility of ’s transfer is lower than it would be without insurance. This generates
a substitution effect, reducing , . The insurance also affects the expected benefit of the transfer
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in + 1. If state = 1, insured participants have a lower disposable income than non-insured
participants due to the premium payment. Therefore, the marginal cost for  of making a transfer
to  in + 1	is higher when they are insured. This income effect crowds-out , .
2.3.3 Case E: Insured participant sends transfer to non-insured participant
In this case, the first order condition for optimization of the insured participant in the network is:
,





We  assume  that  all  three  participants  are  insured,  but  the  propositions  also  hold  when  is not
insured. The effect insurance in this case is threefold. First, the insured participant  has a lower
expected benefit of making a transfer in  as  being  insured,  she  has  a  lower  marginal  utility  of
receiving transfers in + 1. This generates an incentive to decrease transfers in . Second, the
insurance generates a negative income effect in  that increases the marginal cost of making a
transfer. Third, in case that two participants in the network are insured, there is a substitution
effect. As participant  will also receive a positive transfer from  in + 1, the marginal utility of
an additional transfer from  is lower and therefore  reduces her transfer to  accordingly. These
three effects decrease , . However, the total marginal benefit of a transfer is lower than in case
B, wherefore the crowding effect is also expected to be larger when shocks are collective than
when shocks are individual.
2.3.4 Case F: Insured participant decides to send a transfer to an insured participant
In this case, the first order condition for optimization of the insured participant in the network is:
,
= (1 + ) − ′ , + , − , − ℎ + , 2
′
, + (1 − )ℎ+
, +1
2       (17)
We  assume  that  all  three  participants  are  insured,  but  the  propositions  also  hold  when  is not
insured. Similar to case E, the insurance generates an income effect that increases the marginal
cost for  of sending a transfer. Besides, the insurance generates a substitution effect, further
crowding-out the optimal transfer level , .
We see  that  in  all  six  cases,  insurance  crowds-out  informal  risk  sharing  transfers.  Compared  to
the scenario with individual shocks, crowding-out is lager in at least one of the cases when
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shocks are collective. Also, it is easy to see that optimal transfers are higher the larger the initial
welfare weight , . Combining the above six cases, we can formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Crowding-out effect of the insurance
Transfers are reduced in the insurance treatment compared to the non-insurance
treatment. The crowding-out effect is larger, when (1) the participation constraint is
binding, (2) the welfare weight, , , is higher, and (3) shocks are collective rather
than individual.
Proof: see annex of this chapter
Experiment design3.
We use a three-stage experimental design similar to van Dijk et al. (2002) as displayed in Figure
IV-1. In the first stage (baseline), participants were randomly and anonymously matched in
groups of three. Using the strategy method, we measured initial levels of other-regarding
preferences using a three-person dictator game and a three-person trust game. Participants do not
receive feedback on their outcome in the baseline. In the second stage, we randomly and
anonymously re-matched participants in a three-person solidarity network which we will refer to
as NW. NW members participate in a repeated solidarity game over six rounds. Within this stage,
we implemented a between-subject design with four treatments as explained in more detail
below.
In the third stage, we repeated the measurement of altruism and trust, while keeping constant the
NW from the second stage. The comparison between the first and third stages for this NW
matching allows us to measure the change of altruism and trust due to the different treatments.
We explain the procedures used in each stage of the game in more detail below.
Participants knew that the experiment consisted of a total of five parts (the first and the third
stages consisted of two games each). Yet the exact procedures in each part were explained
sequentially. Participants were also informed that only one of the five parts would be randomly
selected for payment at the end of the experiment. In addition, participants received a show up
fee of $20 MXN irrespective of their performance in the experiment. To avoid strategic bias
between stages, participants were informed that they would receive the instructions of each part
as the activity progressed.
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Figure IV-1: Sequence of the experiment
Stages3.1
3.1.1 First stage: baseline
In the first stage of the experiment subjects played two games: a one-shot dictator game (in the
following  DG)  with  two dictators  and  one  recipient  based  on  Panchanathan  et  al.  (2013)  and  a
trust  or  investment  game  (in  the  following  TG)  with  two  trustors  and  one  trustee  (Berg  et  al.
1995; Cassar et al. 2013; Cassar and Rigdon 2011). The games were implemented using a
strategy method similar to Fischbacher et al. (2001). For the DG, participants first decided on
their transfer as if they were all in the role of the dictator. All participants decided simultaneously
and privately how much of an endowment of $150 MXN they wanted to transfer to a recipient
who had not received any endowment. We used a neutral frame for the roles and referred to the
two dictators  as  players  A and  the  recipient  as  player  B.  Participants  were  informed that  if  this
activity were chosen for payment, two participants would be randomly assigned within the triad
to assume the roles of players A, and one participant would assume the role of player B. To make
the decision less abstract, participants received copies of banknotes (Myrseth et al. 2015):10 two
notes of $50 MXN, $10 MXN and $5 MXN, and one note of $20 MXN. To decrease concerns of
experimental demand effects in social dilemmas (Zizzo 2010), we implemented a double-blind
procedure. The value to be transferred to player B was deposited in an envelope marked with the
word “PASS” which was given to an enumerator who then recorded the sent amounts privately,
only knowing the number of the player.
The three-person TG used a similar structure and procedure as the DG. New groups of three
players were randomly and anonymously formed. All players first assumed the role of the trustor
(framed as player A). They received an endowment of seven experimental banknotes of $10
MXN and decided simultaneously and privately how much they wanted to transfer to the trustee
10While we would have preferred to give them experimental units, we considered that this would have involved a too
high cognitive load given the education level of our participants.
1 2 3 4 5 6




Dictator Game Trust Game
Stage 3: ex-post
79Chapter IV: Formal Insurance, Risk Sharing, and the Dynamics of Other-
Regarding Preferences
(framed as player B) by putting the respective number of notes in an envelope marked with the
word “PASS”. They were informed that the amount they put in the envelope would be tripled and
passed on to the player in role B. Following the strategy method, the player in role B decided for
all possible amounts she could have received on how much to return to the players A ($30, $60,
and so on, up to $210 MXN). This decision was made completing a decision table.
In both experiments we used posters to explain the structure of the games and presented different
examples to illustrate how payments were calculated. Before participants made their decisions,
they had to answer a set of control questions. If these were unclear, participants could raise their
hands and one of the enumerators approached them individually to clarify the problems. Once it
was verified that all participants understood the games, they were implemented.
3.1.2 Second stage: solidarity game
In the second stage, participants were again matched randomly and anonymously into solidarity
networks, which will be referred to in the following as NW. Each NW had three participants who
interacted with each other in a repeated solidarity game (in the following SG) based on Selten
and Ockenfels (1998). To increase entitlement over the endowment (Reinstein and Riener 2012),
participants solved a real effort task where they earned a fixed payment of $150 MXN per round.
Subjects were informed that they could lose their complete earnings if they were hit by a shock
after solving the task. Yet, no further information on the probability and structure of the shocks
was provided. As explained in more detail in Section 3.2, the number of NW members who were
affected simultaneously by a shock, as well as whether some random NW members would be
formally insured, was exogenously varied by our experimental design.
After the real effort task, each participant received a note indicating whether she experienced a
shock, as well as the respective earnings of herself and the two other NW members. In case a NW
member suffered a shock, those in the NW who had earned a positive income had to decide if
they wanted to send a predefined amount of $30 MXN to them. We kept the value of the transfers
fixed to increase control over end game distributions of income. In case two NW members
simultaneously suffered a shock, the transfer made by the unaffected member was equally
divided between them. The solidarity game was repeated over six rounds and after each,
participants received feedback on the transfers sent and received from their NW.
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3.1.3 Third stage: ex-post
In this stage, we capture how interaction in the SG affects other-regarding preferences. Therefore,
the DG and the TG were played again in this stage using the same procedures implemented in the
baseline. To capture how participants behave towards NW members who they had interacted with
before, we used a pair matching procedure and repeated the DG and TG with the same groups of
three as in the SG. As the experimental design varied the possibilities of exchange in the SG
exogenously, we are also able to compare whether this conditions possible differences in other-
regarding preferences ex-post.
3.1.4 End of the experiment
After completing the experiment, one of the five parts was chosen for payment by randomly
selecting one of five numbered cards. In the case a DG or TG part was chosen, additionally, one
of three numbered cards was randomly drawn to determine who assumed the role of person A or
B  for  payment.  In  case  the  SG  was  chosen,  one  of  the  six  rounds  was  randomly  selected  for
payment by drawing one of six numbered cards. After determining the payouts, participants were
surveyed individually by the enumerators regarding their socio-demographic characteristics as
these serve as important control variables when eliciting other-regarding preferences (e.g. Fehr
Figure IV-2: Structure of the shocks and treatments









*insurance is mandatory for participants in NW position 2 and 3 only.
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2009; Houser et al. 2010; Karlan 2005). Apart from standard demographic variables, we elicited
proxies for participants’ social capital. Social capital within the experimental session was proxied
by the share of session participants that subjects considered to be their friends. Social capital in
the villages was proxied by the number of people participants stated they could potentially lend
money from, and the number of festive events they had attended in the year prior to the survey.
Also, we elicit the subjects’ experience of a wide range of adverse agricultural and demographic
shocks during the last year. Upon finishing the survey, participants were called one by one to the
experimenter’s table and received their payouts individually. Average payment was $156 MXN
(approx. $9.20 USD at the time of the experiment). This is around 1.5 times the average daily
wage of an agricultural laborer.
Treatments3.2
The solidarity game in the second stage involved four treatments in a between-subject design as
depicted in the table of Figure IV-2. In the treatments with individual shocks, only one NW
member was affected by a shock at a time, whereas in the collective shocks treatments, two NW
members were affected simultaneously. In order to increase comparability across sessions and to
have control over the shock pattern, we predefined the timing of shock occurence for each
member of the NW triad (see lower part of Figure IV-2). In case of individual shocks, for
example, the first NW member was hit by a shock in round three and in round four. The position
of each participant in the NW triad is however allocated randomly. Depending on the period and
treatment, one, two or none of the NW members are affected simultaneously by a shock. Over a
total of six rounds, all NW members were affected twice.
In the treatments without insurance, individual-control and collective-control, none of the
participants in the NW had access to formal insurance. Hence, in case of a negative shock, they
received an income of $0 MXN, plus the transfers from their NW. In treatments with insurance,
two NW members were assigned actuarially fair full insurance. To avoid concerns that self-
selection into the insurance treatments would affect social preferences (i.e. only the less pro-
social participants choose to insure), insurance was always allocated to the randomly assigned
NW positions 2 and 3. Those participants remained insured during all six rounds and received a
fixed income of $100 MXN in each round regardless of whether they were hit by a shock.
Insured participants could still transfer $30 MXN to their fellow shock-affected NW members,
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but could not receive transfers from the non-affected members; neither could uninsured
participants that were not hit by a shock.
Experimental procedures4.
We conducted the experimental sessions in five different villages in the region La Frailesca of the
Mexican State of Chiapas. The importance and history of social capital in village communities in
Chiapas is well documented (Fox 1996; Rico García-Amado et al. 2012). Our case study area is a
commercially orientated maize growing environment dominated by smallholders. This region is
very poor and 52 percent of the population lives below the poverty line (CONEVAL 2010).
Climate risk poses a growing challenge for rural Mexico. Especially the frequency of drought
shocks has increased and is endangering maize yields (Vermeulen 2011), while the state of
Chiapas is particularly vulnerable to weather risks (Monterroso et al. 2014). In response to this
situation, the Mexican government has invested in the development of a subsidized federal
insurance scheme for farmers (Cabestany-Noriega et al. 2013). However, in 2011, only around
8.6 percent of agricultural production units in the poor south were covered on average (Arias
2013). Considering this background, it is highly relevant to study the potential impact that
insurance could have on other-regarding preferences in the region. Regarding health insurance,
there has been a considerable increase in coverage since a free-of-charge, federal health insurance
program (“seguro popular”) was introduced in 2003 (Bonilla-Chacín and Aguilera 2013). It is
targeted specifically to the poor without access to other forms of social security and covers the
most basic, cost-effective interventions.
Participants were selected based on a stratified random sampling procedure from villagers’ lists
provided by village heads (“comisariados”). We stratified the sample based on gender to obtain
equal quota for men and women. Invitation to the session was given by the village heads. The
selected household member was allowed to pass on their invitation to another household member
or relative of the same gender if they could not attend the session.
If there are already strong pre-existing other-regarding preferences between participants, the
scope to generate changes through the experiment is possibly limited. Therefore, in order to
decrease the degree of pre-existing other-regarding preferences, we did not invite only
participants from the same village to the session, but from two to three nearby villages. The
sessions took place in the village assembly room, usually in the largest and best accessible of
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those villages. Up to seven enumerators assisted in conducting the sessions. To guarantee
understanding, we illustrated all parts through posters and had participants answer control
questions in every step. On average, participants correctly answered 92 percent of all questions.
Estimation strategy and results5.
Descriptive results5.1
In total, 441 subjects from 12 villages participated in a total of 19 experimental sessions. Sessions
were conducted with 17 to 38 persons depending on show-up. Table IV-1 gives an overview of
the socio-demographic data of the participants by treatment. Wilcoxon rank-sum tests show that
despite our randomization procedure, there are significant differences in the distributions of
socio-demographic variables across treatments with and without insurance. Namely, for
treatments with individual shocks, there are significant differences between the insurance and no-
insurance treatment in the proportion of females per session, the number of people the subject
could lend money from (proxy for a subject’s social network), and real life shock experiences.
For treatments with collective shocks there are significant differences in the distribution of age,
share of friends in the session and concrete house ownership (proxy for a subject’s wealth). We
must control for these unbalanced variables in our further analysis. Furthermore, we find that
only 2 percent of participants have had agricultural insurance before, while 54 percent have had
some form of public social insurance (“seguro popular”).
In the baseline, participants gave on average 36 percent of their endowment in the DG and around
48 percent in the TG (see Table IV-2). Consistent with the results from Cox (2004) and Ashraf et
al. (2006), we find a high correlation in the giving behavior in the DG and TG (Spearman
correlation is 0.36) indicating that trust behavior can partly be explained by norms of altruism.
For the amounts returned in the TG, measuring trustworthiness, for the average transfer received
of around $30 MXN, the share returned was 38 percent. We also find a significant correlation
between giving in the DG and the share returned in the TG (Spearman correlation is 0.26).
Participants who passed a larger proportion of the endowment in the TG also returned a larger
proportion, indicating that trust and trustworthiness are positively correlated (Spearman
correlation is around 0.22 at the expected amount received of $90 MXN).
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Despite our randomization of treatment assignment, we find some baseline differences in DG and
TG transfers between collective and individual shocks. However, we find a good level of balance
in initial  levels of altruism and trust  across treatments with and without insurance once that  we
condition on the type of shocks (individual and collective; see Table IV-2). The treatment groups
T1 and T2 (individual shocks with and without insurance) and T3 and T4 (collective shocks with
and without insurance) are not significantly different from each other regarding the average
baseline DG and TG transfers (Wilcoxon rank-sum test p>0.05). For baseline trustworthiness at
the average received amount of $90 MXN, we find a small significant difference for T3 and T4,
but  not  so  for  T1  and  T2.  Across  the  other  possible  transfer  amounts,  initial  trustworthiness  is
largely balanced. This means we can compare the effect of insurance separately for individual
and collective shocks without having to account for initial differences.
There is consistency in behaviors across stages as the proportion of the endowment passed in the
DG and TG in the first and third stage is highly correlated (Spearman correlation is 0.53 and 0.41
Table IV-1: Characteristics of participants by treatment









VARIABLE Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD p1 p1
Age; years 33.56 11.99 35.92 16.14 38.26 14.16 34.29 13.63 0.55 0.02**
Agriculture main income2; d 0.93 0.26 0.88 0.33 0.91 0.29 0.86 0.35 0.21 0.32
Education; years 7.59 4.14 7.26 4.67 7.97 3.99 8.17 4.43 0.45 0.40
Female; d 0.60 0.49 0.44 0.50 0.58 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.02** 0.10
Friends in session; share 0.23 0.30 0.20 0.24 0.19 0.22 0.14 0.16 0.56 0.07*
HH has concrete house; d 0.28 0.45 0.26 0.44 0.25 0.43 0.28 0.45 0.72 0.54
HH owns cellphone; d 0.31 0.46 0.31 0.47 0.43 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.90 0.17
No. of festivities 20143 4.64 3.35 5.75 5.37 7.41 6.59 6.82 6.14 0.16 0.56
No. of potential lenders4 4.60 5.45 5.72 6.21 5.65 3.61 5.33 3.55 0.03** 0.57
Shock experience5; d 0.20 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.25 0.43 0.00*** 0.00***
Observations 114 108 117 102
d denotes dummy variable.
1p-values. Categorical variables: Two-sample test of proportions. H0: Variables have equal proportions within treatment groups.
Continuous variables: Wilcoxon rank-sum test. H0: Treatment groups are from populations with the same distribution.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***  < 0.01
2Takes the value 1 if subject’s household’s main income source is agriculture.
3Festivities, such as weddings, religious events, birthdays, baptisms etc. attended in 2014.
4Answer to the question: “If you urgently needed $500 MXN, how many people outside your household would be willing to lend you that
amount?”
5Takes the value 1 if subject suffered one or more of the following shocks in the last 3 years: drought, excessive rain, storm, pests, livestock
illness, erosion, sales price decrease, input price increase, low sales, severe illness, death of family member, loss of income source, robbery,
fire.
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for the DG and TG, respectively). Yet, there is a decrease of contributions between the baseline
and the ex-post measure, although this difference is only significant for the TG in treatments T1
and T4 (Wilcoxon rank-sum test p<0.05).
The upper graph of Figure IV-3 displays the absolute transfer amounts in $MXN received in the
SG (second stage) by treatment. As intended by the experimental design, insured participants in
insurance  treatments  (light  grey  bars),  i.e.  those  in  NW  positions  2  or  3,  did  not  receive  any
transfers from their NW. Thereby we can analyze the effect of this decrease in the possibilities to
receive transfers on the value of transfers they send to other NW members, and the subsequent
effect on other-regarding preferences towards the whole NW. Because of the varying numbers of
Table IV-2: Summary of DG/TG transfers by treatment









VARIABLE Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD p1 p1
Dictator Game
Transfers
Baseline 0.30 0.28 0.33 0.26 0.39 0.24 0.42 0.26 0.32 0.24
Ex-post 0.30 0.24 0.30 0.24 0.37 0.24 0.41 0.30 0.98 0.48
Difference 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01
p1 0.55 0.58 0.43 0.52
Trust Game
Transfers
Baseline 0.47 0.25 0.42 0.22 0.52 0.24 0.51 0.24 0.21 0.89
Ex-post 0.39 0.22 0.40 0.18 0.49 0.23 0.43 0.23 0.36 0.11
Difference -0.08 -0.02 -0.03 -0.08
p1 0.01** 0.66 0.12 0.01**
Conditional Returns
Baseline, $90 MXN 0.37 0.20 0.37 0.20 0.37 0.16 0.43 0.22 0.68 0.03**
Ex-post, $90 MXN 0.32 0.20 0.31 0.16 0.36 0.18 0.37 0.22 0.84 0.69
Difference -0.05 -0.06 -0.01 -0.06
p1 0.07* 0.08* 0.60 0.01*
Observations 114 108 117 102
All values expressed as a shares of the endowment.
1 p-value from Wilcoxon rank-sum test. H0: Groups are from populations with the same distribution.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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instances in which subjects could receive transfers across treatments, we must distinguish
between the situations in which subjects know they cannot receive a transfer, and when they
know they can. We thereby acknowledge that people might not only care about absolute
outcomes when evaluating an interaction as positive or negative, but take the maximum value of
transfers the NW partner(s) could have provided them with as a reference point, as similarly
suggested by Falk and Fischbacher (2006). The authors provide evidence that the attribution of
intentions indeed matter in human interactions, as opposed to standard “consequentialist” utility
theory which assumes utility is derived exclusively from the consequences of interactions. While
we cannot observe intentions directly in our experiment, it seems likely that network members
not receiving a transfer evaluate this network transaction differently when they know their
network was unable to provide transfers, as opposed to when they know it was able – even
though the consequence in terms of income is identical. Therefore, we cannot only look at
absolute transfers received, but at relative transfers, i.e. the proportion of the maximum possible
value, conditional on the possibility to receive a transfer. The relative transfers by treatment are
depicted in the lower graph of Figure IV-3, where only subjects that could receive transfers are
incorporated and insured NW members are excluded. When shocks are individual, we find that
the total average receipt of transfers is crowded-out by insurance (bars over “Total” in left-hand
upper graph of Figure IV-3). However, contrary to the predictions of the model, we find that
insurance does not crowd-out transfers received by non-insured NW members (bars over
“NW1”). Instead, subjects in NW position 1, i.e. the non-insured, receive significantly more
transfers both in absolute and relative terms (Wilcoxon rank-sum test p<0.01). In contrast, when
shocks are collective, insurance increases the absolute value of transfers received by those in NW
position 1 (Wilcoxon rank-sum test p<0.01), but decreases the relative, conditional value
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test p<0.01).
Determinants of transfers received5.2
To control for initial differences in socio-economic characteristics of the participants, we estimate
the following linear random effects model explaining transfers in the SG:
, = + 1 + + 1 × + + ∑ + + (18)
In this model, the dependent variable  is the transfer value received from the NW partner(s),
expressed either as the absolute value of the transfer received in $MXN (absolute) or the share of
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Figure IV-3: Average solidarity game transfers by treatment
the maximum amount one could possibly have received, conditional on the possibility of
receiving a transfer (relative). The dummy variable 1  controls for the position within the
NW. A value of 1 indicates that individual  is in NW position 1.  is a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 for treatments in which some members of a NW are insured. The term × 1  is
the interaction of the above variables and measures the heterogeneous effect of insurance on
transfers received by the non-insured NW members, compared to the insured. The vector
	controls for individual-specific and time-invariant socio- demographic variables. This includes
all variables that were not balanced across treatments: age, female dummy, the share of friends in
the session, shock experience, number of potential lenders, and the concrete house dummy.  is
a  dummy  for  the  experimental  period,  with = 2, . . . ,6 . The time-invariant and time-variant
random errors are expressed in  and , respectively.
Table IV-3 displays the results of estimating equation (18) separately for individual and
collective shocks, as well as absolute and relative transfers. When shocks are individual,
participants on average receive an absolute value of $9.87 MXN from the NW (column 1). This
number, however, includes zero values for insured NW members, who, by definition, cannot
receive transfers. Conditioning on the possibility to receive transfers, subjects receive 56 percent
of the maximum value of transfers possible. As intended by the insurance treatment, the absolute
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value of transfers received decreases significantly when insurance is available (columns 1 and 2).
The relative value of transfers, however (column 3), does not change significantly.
A more interesting aspect is whether the effect of insurance differs among the insured and non-
insured NW members. Results in columns 2 illustrate the fact that insured NW members, those in
NW positions 2 and 3 in the insurance treatment, cannot receive any transfers and therefore, the
average NW participant receives significantly less absolute transfers in the insurance treatment as
Table IV-3: Effects of insurance on SG transfers received by type of shock
INDIVIDUAL COLLECTIVE
absolute relative absolute relative
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
NW1; d=1 0.37 -0.31 -0.02
(0.80) (0.26) (0.02)
Ins.; d=1*NW1; d=1 12.26*** 7.93***
(1.29) (1.27)
Ins.; d=1 -6.68*** -10.45*** 0.09 -1.07** -3.67*** -0.27*** -0.26***
(0.89) (0.86) (0.07) (0.43) (0.29) (0.08) (0.08)
Constant 9.87*** 8.89*** 0.56*** 5.01*** 4.72*** 0.76*** 0.76***
(1.57) (1.29) (0.09) (1.22) (1.07) (0.14) (0.14)
Socio-econ.1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,332 1,332 300 1,314 1,314 302 302
R2  within 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.17 0.17 0.01 0.01
between 0.21 0.54 0.04 0.04 0.41 0.14 0.14
overall 0.07 0.12 0.04 0.14 0.22 0.08 0.08
Random effects regressions. Standard errors clustered at NW level in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Dependent variable: models (1), (2), (4), (5): absolute value of transfers received ($MXN); models (3), (6), (7): transfers received as share of
maximum possible transfer value, conditional on possibility to receive a transfer.
d denotes dummy variable.
Ins.=1 if participant belongs to NW with insurance.
NW 1=1 if participant is in NW position 1, i.e. is never insured.
1Socio-economic controls include: age (years), female (dummy), friends in session (share), no. of pot. lenders, no. of shocks 2014.
Table IV-4: Heterogeneous effect on SG transfers received by network position
INDIVIDUAL COLLECTIVE
Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
@NW Position 1 =1 1.81 0.09 4.26*** -0.26***
(1.39) (0.07) (1.25) (0.08)
=0 -10.45*** -3.67**
(0.86) (0.29)
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Contrasts based on models (2), (3), (5), and (7) in Table IV-3. Standard errors clustered at NW level in parentheses.
Blanks: Transfers to subjects in NW positions 2 and 3 are zero in insurance treatments and not taken into account with relative transfers.
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compared to the control treatment. In contrast, the net effect of the presence of formal insurance
in the NW on non-insured members, corresponding to	 + 	 in equation (18) and presented in
Table IV-4, is not significantly different from zero. Therefore, we can conclude that insurance
does not crowd-out transfers to non-insured NW members facing individual shocks.
Columns 4 to 7 in Table IV-3 present the results for collective shocks. We find that on average
participants receive an absolute transfer of $5.01 MXN, which again includes zero values for the
insured NW members. When conditioning on the possibility to receive a transfer, we find that
subjects receive 76 percent of the maximum transfer value possible. The insurance treatment has
the desired effect of reducing the average absolute and relative value of the transfer (columns 4
and 6). Those in NW position 1, with no access to insurance, receive on average a significantly
larger absolute transfer amount in the insurance treatment (Table IV-4). This could, however, be
driven by the fact that at the time of a collective shock, with some NW members being insured,
there are now two instead of one potential sender of transfers. Nevertheless, each of them is
sending a significantly lower relative value. This finding confirms the predicted crowding-out
effect of the model. The relatively large magnitude of the decrease in relative transfers, especially
compared to the treatment with individual shocks where no significant decrease is found, could
be explained by an aggravation of the crowding-out through a bystander effect (e.g.
Panchanathan et al. 2013). This effect refers to the empirical finding that individuals are less
likely to provide help when more potential helpers are available. Insured participants receive a
constant positive income unaffected by shocks, and therefore can make transfers even though
they had experienced a shock. This increases the number of potential “helpers” at the time of a
shock in the NW. As a result of the bystander effect, however, each of them is less likely to
provide help to the uninsured NW member suffering from a shock, as compared to a situation
where there is only one potential “helper”.
Result 1
Insurance does not crowd-out the absolute value of transfers received by non-
insured NW members when shocks are individual, but crowds-in absolute transfers
when shocks are collective. Yet, only when shocks are collective insurance induces
a crowding-out effect on the value of transfers received by non-insured NW
members relative to the maximum transfer value possible.
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Change of other-regarding preferences5.3
In order to analyze how other-regarding preferences are affected by the presence of insurance in
informal risk sharing groups,  we explore the differences in ex-post  and baseline transfers in the
DG and TG and estimate the following model:
Δ = + + + + ′ + (19)
Here, Δ 	refers to the difference in the ex-post versus baseline measure of other-regarding
preferences. Hence, it denotes either the difference in the proportions of endowment passed in
DG or TG, or returned in the TG. The sub-index  refers to each participant.  and  refer
to the transfers made in the baseline DG and TG by individual , respectively.  is defined as
before. The vector  contains socio-demographic controls and the term  denotes unobserved
effects. The model is estimated with OLS for the difference in proportions of endowment sent in
the DG and TG. For the proportions returned in the TG, a random effects model is estimated by
treating the return decisions for the different possible TG amounts received as periods, while
additionally controlling for their absolute and squared value in $MXN.
To further explore the drivers of a potential change in other-regarding preferences, we
disaggregate the effect of insurance on the insured and non-insured NW members by estimating
the following equation:
Δ = + + × 1 + 1 + + + ′ +  (20)
Here, 1  is a dummy that takes the value 1 if participant  is in NW position 1 and therefore
uninsured in the insurance treatments. Hence the term × 1  measures the heterogeneous
effect of insurance on the uninsured, as compared to the insured. Lastly, in separate regressions,
we want to shed light on the mechanisms behind the changes in other-regarding preferences.
Hence, we estimate an additional regression where we control for the receipt of transfers:
Δ = 0 + 1 + 2 × + 3 + 4 + 5 + ′ + (21)
With  we denote the transfers received by subject , either as the absolute amount in $MXN or
expressed as proportion of the maximum amount that she could have received during the SG. The
coefficient of the term × 	furthermore tells us if the effect of transfers on other-regarding
preferences is different for those in NWs where some members have insurance.
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Table IV-5: Effect of insurance on altruism, trust and trustworthiness by type of shock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DG DG TG TG TG return TG return
INDIVIDUAL
Ins.; d=1 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
DG1 -0.63*** -0.64*** 0.16* 0.17** -0.03 -0.03
(0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)
TG1 0.32*** 0.34*** -0.78*** -0.75***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
TG amount; $MXN -0.00* -0.00*
(0.00) (0.00)
TG amount; $MXN^2 -0.63** -0.63**
(0.05) (0.04)
Constant 0.03 0.05 0.24*** 0.30*** 0.25** 0.24**
(0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Socio-econ. No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 222 222 222 222 222 222
R2 0.41 0.42 0.48 0.51 0.35 0.36
COLLECTIVE
Ins.; d=1 0.04 0.02 -0.06** -0.08** -0.01 -0.02
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (-0.56) (-0.78)
DG1 -0.54*** -0.55*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.03 0.03
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.63) (0.59)
TG1 0.38*** 0.36*** -0.63*** -0.64***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
TG amount; $MXN -0.00*** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00)
TG amount; $MXN^2 0.00* 0.00*
(0.05) (0.04)
Constant -0.01 0.13 0.22*** 0.32*** 0.28*** 0.31***
(0.04) (0.08) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05)
Socio-Econ1 No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 219 219 219 219 219 219
R2 0.29 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.29 0.36
Standard errors clustered at NW level in parentheses.
OLS regressions for models (1) to (4) and random effects regression for models (5) and (6). *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Dependent variable=difference of post- and baseline DG/TG transfer shares sent/ returned.
d denotes dummy variable.
Ins.=1 if participant belongs to NW with insurance.
DG1/TG1 refers to the share of endowment sent in the baseline of the DG/TG.
1Socio-economic control variables include: age (years), female (d), friends in session (share), concrete house (d), no. of pot. lenders, no. of
shocks experienced 2014.
Additional controls in models (5) and (6): amount received in TG ($MXN) refers to amount received from the sender in the TG.
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The results for the estimation of equation (19) are presented in Table IV-5. The upper panel
presents the result for the treatments with individual shocks, whereas the lower panel presents the
results for collective shocks. Columns 1 and 2 present the effects on changes in the proportions of
endowment given in the DG, columns 3 and 4 on changes in proportions given in the TG, and
columns 5 and 6 present changes in the proportions returned in the TG. As can be inferred from
columns 1 and 2, there is considerable stability in the proportion of the endowment passed in the
DG, both in the control and in the insurance treatment and for individual and collective shocks.
Yet, we observe some convergence, as participants with higher baseline DG transfers decreased
their transfers in the ex-post measurement. In contrast, we find that transfers in the TG increased
about 30 percentage points from the baseline to the ex-post measurement in the control treatment
without insurance, both for individual and collective shocks (column 4). Whereas the insurance
does not crowd-out other regarding preferences in treatments with individual shocks, we find a
significant crowding-out effect of around 8 percentage points with collective shocks. Results in
columns 5 and 6 indicate that, on average, in the post-test subjects display higher levels of
trustworthiness, measured by the proportion returned in the TG, both for individual and collective
shocks. Yet, no significant difference is observed for trustworthiness in the insurance treatment.
Table IV-6 presents the results from estimating equation (20), where the effects of insurance are
disaggregated for non-insured and insured participants. 11  We find that while there are no
significant differences between control and insurance treatment on altruism and on
trustworthiness, there are significant effects on trust. Interestingly, however, we find that the
direction of the effect that insurance within the informal NW has on subsequent trust depends on
whether the shocks are individual or collective. Whereas for individual shocks, insurance crowds-
in trust of non-insured NW members towards their NW partners, it crowds-out trust levels of the
insured NW members towards their NW when shocks are collective.
Result 2
Formal insurance crowds-in trust levels of the non-insured when shocks are
individual, but crowds-out trust levels of the insured when shocks are collective.
Formal insurance has no effect on altruism and trustworthiness.
11The effect for insured NW members corresponds to the coefficient  in equation (20), while the effect for non-
insured participants corresponds to the coefficients	 + .
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The positive effect of insurance on trust levels of non-insured subjects towards their NW is
consistent with a perceived positive valuation of the transfer interaction. Non-insured NW
members could have anticipated that insured members have no incentive to send them transfers.
Table IV-6: Heterogeneous effect of insurance on DG/TG by network position
INDIVIDUAL COLLECTIVE
DG TG TG return DG TG TG return.
@NW Position 1 =1 -0.04 0.10** 0.04 0.07 -0.02 -0.01
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
=0 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.10*** -0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Contrasts based on OLS estimation of models (2), (4), and (6) in Table IV-5.
Standard errors clustered at NW level in parentheses.
Yet, we find that insurance does not crowd-out transfers received by the non-insured in the SG.
In response to this positive surprise, non-insured NW members could have increased the degree
of attachment towards the NW that provided them with transfers and perceived them as more
trustworthy. In contrast, in the treatment with collective shocks, we find opposite effects of
insurance on the absolute and relative value of the transfers received by non-insured subjects.
Therefore, whether they value the interaction with their NW as positive or negative will depend
on whether they care more about absolute or relative transfers when evaluating a transfer
interaction as positive or negative. We will shed light on this issue when estimating equation
(21), controlling separately for absolute and relative transfers, as discussed below.
The negative effect of the insurance treatment on trust levels expressed by participants in NW
positions 2 and 3, the insured NW members, is consistent with the hypothesis that reduced
opportunities for positive interaction, in our case defined by the receipt of transfers, decreases the
attachment towards NW members. Yet, it remains an open question why this negative effect is
observed only in the case of collective and not in the case of individual shocks. In both cases,
when hit by a shock, insured members receive no transfers from their NW, but an insurance
compensation, so they have a constant income across periods. So why is it that the insured NW
members reduce trust in their NW only in the collective shock treatment? In case of experiencing
a shock, the income of insured NW members, consisting of the indemnity payment, is framed as a
loss. Hence, the only difference induced by the introduction of insurance in the collective
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compared to the individual shock treatment is that when insured subjects experience a shock, they
are still asked to provide a transfer to the other shock-affected, but non-insured NW member.
With individual shocks, there is only one NW member affected by a shock per period and so with
insurance there are no instances in which an insured member suffers a shock and could provide
transfers to another affected NW member at the same time. When the insured subjects’ income is
framed as  a  loss  when experiencing  a  shock,  this  may imply  a  reduction  in  utility.  Rather  than
providing transfers, these subjects might hope to receive transfers from the NW, which they
cannot. The negative effect on trust levels of the insured towards their NW might therefore be
more pronounced in the collective as compared to the individual shocks treatment, where there
are no instances in which transfers could be made from earnings framed as losses.
To shed more light on the underlying mechanisms, results from estimating equation (21) are
presented in Table IV-7 and Table IV-8. We find mainly positive coefficients on absolute or
relative transfers received, indicating that these could positively affect the ex-post level of other-
regarding preferences. However, there is only a significant effect of relative transfers and
collective shocks on trust. This finding points to the notion that individuals care more about
relative than absolute transfers when evaluating a risk sharing interaction. For collective shocks,
we find that, on average, higher transfers relative to the maximum possible increase trust levels
(columns 6 and 8 in Table IV-8). When controlling for insurance, the effect and significance level
decreases, which captures the finding that relative transfers received by uninsured NW members
are decreased by insurance. The reason why this decrease does not translate into significantly
lower trust levels expressed by the non-insured could be that relative transfers must go below a
certain threshold level before initiating a downward trend in trust levels. This is a matter of
further investigation.
All  in all,  we can only partly confirm the theoretical  predictions asserting that  formal insurance
crowds-out other-regarding preferences among members of informal risk sharing groups. While
we find some crowding-out of trust, we do not find similar effects on altruism or trustworthiness.
Moreover, the crowding effects seem to be context specific, as we only observe them in
treatments with collective shocks, but not with individual shocks. Moreover, as expected, we find
differential effects of insurance on the preference dynamics of insured and uninsured subjects
within a NW.
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Table IV-7: Mechanism of altruism and trust dynamics (absolute)
INDIVIDUAL COLLECTIVE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DG TG DG TG DG TG DG TG
Ins.; d=1 0.05 0.03 0.069 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Ins.; d=1*T.abs. -0.13* -0.01 -0.22 -0.25
(0.076) (0.06) (0.19) (0.17)
T. abs. 0.01 -0.00 0.07 0.016 0.08 0.08 0.28 0.29*
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.18) (0.16)
DG1 -0.64*** 0.17*** -0.64*** 0.17*** -0.54*** 0.17** -0.55*** 0.17***
(0.08) (0.056) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
TG1 0.34*** -0.75*** 0.34*** -0.75*** 0.36*** -0.62*** 0.36*** -0.64***
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.074) (0.06)
Constant 0.04 0.32*** 0.00 0.29*** 0.13** 0.24*** 0.07 0.26***
(0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
Socio-econ.1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 222 222 222 222 219 219 219 219
R2 0.42 0.51 0.43 0.52 0.32 0.55 0.33 0.55
Standard errors clustered at NW level in parentheses.
OLS Regressions. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Dependent variable=difference of ex-post and baseline DG/TG shares of endowment passed on.
Ins.=1 if participant belongs to NW with insurance.
d denotes dummy variable.
T. abs.=value of transfers received in SG (in $100MXN).
DG1/TG1 refers to the share of endowment passed on in the baseline of the DG/TG.
1Socio-economic control variables include: age (years), female (dummy), friends in session (share), concrete house (d), no. of pot. lenders, no. of
shocks 2014.
Conclusion and outlook6.
Poor households are often restricted in their access to formal capital markets and thus rely on
informal insurance networks. The mutual exchange of transfers facilitated by these networks has
been shown to foster the development of other-regarding preferences among its members. In this
paper, we analyze how the introduction of formal insurance affects the exchange of transfers in
informal solidarity networks, and the subsequent effect of this change in informal exchange on
the development of other-regarding preferences. We develop a theoretical model and use a
framed  field  experiment  with  baseline  and  ex-post  measures  of  altruism,  trust  and
trustworthiness, and a solidarity game with different treatments. Thereby we investigate (1) how
insurance, exogenously assigned to some network members, and (2) the covariance structure of
negative income shocks affect the transfer behavior, as well as trust, trustworthiness and altruism.
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Table IV-8: Mechanism of altruism and trust dynamics (relative)
INDIVIDUAL COLLECTIVE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DG TG DG TG DG TG DG TG
Ins.; d=1 0.05 0.03 0.07 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Ins.; d=1*T. rel. -0.15* -0.01 -0.01 -0.05
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
T. rel. 0.01 -0.00 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.10*** 0.09 0.09*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
DG1 -0.64*** 0.17*** -0.63*** 0.17*** -0.54*** 0.17*** -0.55*** 0.17***
(0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
TG1 0.34*** -0.75*** 0.34*** -0.75*** 0.36*** -0.63*** 0.36*** -0.64***
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Constant 0.04 0.32*** 0.00 0.29*** 0.14** 0.23*** 0.07 0.26***
(0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
Socio-econ.1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 222 222 222 222 219 219 219 219
R2 0.42 0.51 0.43 0.52 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.35
Standard errors clustered at NW level in parentheses.
OLS regressions. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Dependent variable=difference of ex-post and baseline DG/TG shares of endowment passed on.
Ins.=1 if participant belongs to NW with insurance.
d denotes dummy variable.
T. rel.=Transfers received in SG (proportion of max. possible transfers).
DG1/TG1 refers to the share of endowment passed on in the baseline of the DG/TG.
1Socio-economic control variables include: age (years), female (d), friends in session (share), no. of pot. lenders, concrete house (d), no. of
shocks experienced 2014.
Our results provide only partial support for the theoretical model. As proposed by the model, the
development of other-regarding preferences depends on the transfer interactions in the risk
sharing network. Interactions consisting in a higher level of transfers received lead to an increase
in the level of participants’ other-regarding preferences towards their network members.
Interactions resulting in a lower level of transfers received lead to a decrease in other-regarding
preferences. In this regard, however, only the value of transfers received relative to the maximum
possible value matters, not the absolute amount. Furthermore, an effect of transfers on other-
regarding preferences is only found in particular circumstances: when shocks are collective, i.e.
more than one network member is affected at a time, and for one measure of other-regarding
preferences,  namely  trust.  No  effects  are  found  on  altruism  or  trustworthiness.  This  can  be
explained only partially by different model predictions regarding the crowding-out effect of
insurance on transfers dependent on the structure of the shocks.
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When shocks are individual, i.e. negatively correlated among network members and some of
them become insured, absolute and relative transfers received by the non-insured members are
not significantly altered. This is valued positively by non-insured network members, who could
be expecting to receive lower transfers from the insured network partners and therefore increase
trust levels. When shocks are collective, i.e. positively correlated among network members and
some of them become insured, non-insured members within those networks receive a higher
absolute value of transfers, but a lower value relative to the maximum possible amount. However,
we do not find significantly lower trust levels of non-insured network members in that case.
Possibly, there exists a threshold level of relative transfers below which trust levels start to decay,
and the reduction in transfers found here is not strong enough. This is a matter of further research.
Insured subjects, however, decrease their trust towards the other network members in the
collective shocks treatment. This might be explained by the following notion: when insured
subjects are suffering a loss, even though they are instantly indemnified by the insurance, still
may perceive having incurred a loss in terms of utility. In collective shocks treatments, there will
be instances in which they are nevertheless asked to provide a transfer to the non-insured. Instead
of being asked to provide transfers, in this case they might rather wish to receive transfers, which
they cannot. The negative impulse on trust levels of the non-insured network members might
therefore be more pronounced compared to the individual shocks treatment, where it could not
occur that transfers had to be made from indemnity payments.
Our results illustrate that it is important to take into account heterogeneous effects of introducing
insurance to informal risk sharing networks and consider the effect on those left uninsured
separately. Moreover, the degree of covariance of the negative income shocks plays a strong role:
when formal insurance is introduced, potential negative effects on informal transfers and trust
levels are expected to occur especially when shocks are positively correlated, i.e. they affect
several members of the network at a time. This is particularly problematic as informal risk
sharing is generally efficient in indemnifying negatively correlated, idiosyncratic shocks
(Fafchamps and Gubert 2007; Mobarak and Rosenzweig 2013). The potential benefit of formal
insurance is especially given when shocks are covariate, or positively correlated across informal
risk sharing groups, which may collapse in that case. Special care must then be given to those left
uncovered by formal insurance, as they might not only receive less transfers, but possibly also be
perceived as less trustworthy by their social networks.
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Further research is needed to find optimal insurance designs that increase the complementarities
of formal insurance and risk sharing networks, such as group-based index insurance. It was
shown  that  incomplete  insurance,  when  offered  to  members  of  a  risk  sharing  group,  could
complement informal risk sharing and crowd-in risk sharing transfers (Dercon et al. 2014;
Dercon et al. 2006; Mobarak and Rosenzweig 2013). This is especially relevant with regard to
index-based insurance, where welfare could be increased when idiosyncratic basis risk is shared
among the informal network members, while covariate shocks are covered by the insurance.
However, when offering group-based insurance to cooperative groups instead of risk sharing
networks, demand was found to be low, especially for those farmers that distrusted their fellow
cooperative members (McIntosh et al. 2015). This suggests that trust levels within informal
networks  must  be  sufficiently  high.  Apart  from  that,  it  is  worthwhile  to  further  analyze  self-
selection into insurance. On the one hand, especially those without well-functioning social
networks could benefit from formal insurance. On the other hand, as suggested by Lenel and
Steiner (2016), solidarity networks might forego providing transfers to members in need who
knowingly decided not to take up formal insurance when they could.
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Annex: Risk sharing model
Proof of Proposition 1
First order condition for an interior solution implies that the optimal transfer ,∗   solves:
,
= (1 + ) + = 0
where
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Proof of Proposition 2
Case A: Individual shocks. Non-insured sends transfer to insured participant.
Define the cost of insurance by 	 = 	 ℎ (fair premium) and the loss covered as ℎ. Comparative
statics for the first order condition imply:
Income effect:
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Case B. Individual shocks. Insured sends transfer to non-insured participant.
When the sender of transfers  is insured, then 	= 	 	= 	0.
Reduced shocks:
, = − ,
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Case C. Individual shocks. Insured sends transfer to insured participant.
When the sender of transfers  is insured, then 	= 	 	= 	0.
Reduced shocks:
, = − ,
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Case E. Collective shocks. Insured sends transfer to non-insured participant.
When the sender of transfers  is insured, then 	= 	 	= 	0.
Reduced shocks:
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Income effect:
, = − ,
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Case F. Collective shocks. Insured sends transfer to insured participant.
When the sender of transfers  is insured, then 	= 	 	= 	0.
Reduced shocks:
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V Summary and Discussion
The papers presented in this dissertation highlight various aspects related to risk with regards to
rural development, and more specifically, to technology adoption and social capital development
of rural households. The papers are based on the analysis of farmer surveys and framed field
experiments conducted from April to September 2015 with maize farmers in the state of Chiapas
in southern Mexico. The study area is a major maize growing region with commercially
orientated smallholders that, in majority, live below the poverty line.
The practical relevance of the results and implications of the papers presented here, as well as of
any other experimental study, hinge on the assumption of external validity. While internal
validity  refers  to  ability  of  the  experimental  design  to  doubtlessly  demonstrate  a  causal
relationship, external validity refers to the ability to generalize these found relationships to other
persons, times and settings (Roe and Just 2009). A potential lack of external validity is argued to
be the main drawback of economic experiments (Loewenstein 1999). In all the presented papers,
generalizability towards the group of interest, farmers, is improved by applying framed field
experiments with non-standard subjects, namely farmers, as compared to standard lab
experiments  (Levitt  and  List  2007).  Whether  the  results  apply  to  farmers  in  other  countries  or
cultural areas depends on how closely they match the subjects of these papers in terms of relevant
observed and unobserved characteristics. The specific aspects and findings addressed in each
paper, as well as their external validity, are critically discussed in the following.
The first paper of this dissertation in Chapter II, “Insurance for Technology Adoption: An
Experimental Evaluation of Schemes and Subsidies with Maize Farmers in Mexico”, analyzes
experimentally how bundling the purchase of a risky technology, namely a higher yielding maize
seed variety, with different insurance schemes, affects the total take-up of that variety. In this
regard, the paper looks at the effects of (1) partial insurance versus full insurance, (2)
geographical versus local basis risk, and (3) fair versus below-fair premium. This is the first
paper to evaluate insurance schemes with different levels of risk reduction, basis risk and
premium subsidies regarding their effect on technology adoption. The results add to the debate on
insurance serving as a potential tool for incentivizing agricultural producers to adopt more
productive, but more risky technologies, and thereby enabling them to escape poverty (Carter et
al. 2016; Fan et al. 2013; Lybbert and Carter 2014; Nicola 2015; World Bank 2013).
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The  results  suggest  that  insurance  at  fair  and  below-fair  premiums  can  be  a  useful  tool  for
encouraging the adoption of more profitable agricultural technologies, and insurance schemes
with  different  levels  of  risk  reduction  and  payout  forms  can  serve  this  purpose.  Farmers  in  our
sample responded most to a higher level of risk reduction provided by full indemnity insurance,
covering the whole cost of the seed. The partial insurance schemes performed worse in terms of
encouraging adoption, but did not significantly differ from each other. In contrast to the
predictions, index insurance with local and geographical basis risk did not perform worse than
indemnity insurance without geographical basis risk. Furthermore, the results suggest that
subsidization of insurance premiums below the fair premium does increase average adoption,
however not as strongly as predicted by the risk preferences of our sample. Offering insurance at
below-fair premiums had no additional effect on adoption under full or index insurance. This
finding challenges the usefulness of insurance subsidies. Nevertheless, the results contribute to
the recent debate on the benefits of index insurance, given low demand and basis risk (e.g.
Binswanger-Mkhize 2012) and confirm its positive effect on technology adoption. Future studies
should focus on increasing benefits of insurance from the perspective of farmers in order to
increase  their  demand also  at  loaded  premiums.  Apart  from risk  considerations,  the  paper  finds
that the degree to which farmers perceive the cultivation of their traditional maize varieties to be
rooted in their tradition, also affects to what extent they will readily adopt a higher yielding
variety. This highlights the general importance of analyzing more thoroughly the interplay
between different factors conditioning technology adoption, such as behavioral aspects,
traditional institutions, market constraints and profitability (Foster and Rosenzweig 2010).
In addition to using non-standard subjects, this first paper tackles potential issues of external
validity by applying an incentivized business simulation game (Musshoff and Hirschauer 2014).
Hereby, the generalizability of the experiment is increased through the use of a context that
closely  resembles  the  real  decision  situation  of  the  farmers  (Levitt  and  List  2007),  while  still
allowing for exact causal inference. Hence, in essence, the predictions from the game regarding
the effects of insurance are likely to be replicated in a real decision context, given the other
assumptions of the game and characteristics of the subjects apply.
The second paper in Chapter III, “The Relationship between Farmers’ Shock Experiences and
their Uncertainty Preferences - Experimental Evidence from Mexico” addresses the relationship
between farmers’ uncertainty preferences, sociodemographic characteristics and their experience
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of adverse harvest shocks. Uncertainty preferences refer to a range of preference parameters as
derived from Cumulative Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and
Kahneman 1992), namely risk aversion, loss aversion and probability weighting, as well as
ambiguity aversion (Ellsberg 1961). A series of incentivized lottery games are used to estimate
these parameters with the sample of Mexican maize farmers, controlling for (1)
sociodemographic characteristics and (2) the severity of experienced maize harvest losses. While
there are several field studies examining the effect of shocks on risk preferences with subjects
from developing countries, only few look at preferences beyond Expected Utility Theory and
take into account Cumulative Prospect Theory, and none has looked at ambiguity aversion.
Therefore, this paper sheds light on the role that the experience of adverse random shocks, as
well as a range of sociodemographic variables, have in explaining one’s uncertainty preferences.
First of all, the results show a strong rejection of Expected Utility Theory in favor of Cumulative
Prospect Theory. Furthermore, after correcting for potential endogeneity issues, they provide
evidence that having experienced more severe harvest losses leads to more risk aversion and
stronger overweighting of small probabilities. No effects of higher loss severity were found on
loss  aversion  or  ambiguity  aversion.  Additionally,  the  results  of  this  paper  suggest  that,  on
average, farmers from richer households display less overweighting of small probabilities,
farmers from larger households are more risk and loss averse, and farmers with more diversified
incomes are more risk averse. Subjects from indigenous families are more risk and ambiguity
averse, while ambiguity aversion is not significantly related to any other sociodemographic
variable.
If farmers become more risk averse in the aftermath of harvest shocks, this could well affect their
future investment and technology adoption behavior, potentially making them more hesitant to
engage in risky but productivity enhancing practices. This effect could be exacerbated by the
farmers’ more distorted assessment of small probabilities after experiencing shocks. Such an
endogenous change in preferences could lead to “behavioral poverty traps” (Carter and Barrett
2006) and therefore makes the case for policies facilitating risk management through insurance,
disaster relief and safety nets in poor rural regions even stronger.
The practical meaningfulness of the found change in uncertainty preferences after experiencing
shocks relies on the ability of these parameters to predict real-world decisions of farmers. The
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predictive power of experimentally elicited risk preferences on risk-related farm decisions,
however, has sometimes been challenged. For example, no relationship could be found between
risk aversion and insurance take-up or diversification (Hellerstein et al. 2013), and growing of
cash crops or market-orientation (Verschoor et al. 2016). However, other studies did find
significant relationships between risk and ambiguity aversion and improved seed adoption
(Barham et al. 2014; Liu 2013), between risk and loss aversion and pesticide use (Liu and Huang
2013), and between risk aversion and fertilizer use (Verschoor et al. 2016). On a side note, this
second paper finds that more diversified farmers are more risk averse, which is in line with
predictions from economic theory and suggests a correspondence of the experimental risk
measure and field behavior. In order to be able to assess external validity of uncertainty
preferences, it is crucial to collect them together with survey data, as done for this dissertation.
All in all, it is being argued that in the future, experimental economics will benefit from
combining lab data with data from, if possible, representative surveys (Gächter 2009) to exploit
complementarities across methods when interpreting research findings.
The third paper in Chapter IV, “Formal Insurance, Risk Sharing, and the Dynamics of Other-
Regarding Preferences”, analyzes how selectively providing formal insurance to members of a
risk sharing network affects informal transfers and, subsequently, the dynamics of other-
regarding preferences within that network. Many poor households in developing countries are
excluded from formal financial markets and therefore rely on the mutual exchange within
informal risk sharing networks to protect themselves against adverse income shocks. Social
interactions in the aftermath of such shocks have been found to strengthen the social ties among
members of these networks, while formal insurance has been found to crowd-out these transfers.
Similarly, this third paper finds that when some members of risk sharing networks become
formally insured, it affects the informal exchange of transfers among members, as well as their
other-regarding preferences. This is the first study to explore the effect of insurance on other-
regarding preferences in that context. In order to do so, an incentivized, three-stage experimental
design with a baseline and an ex-post measurement of altruism, trust and trustworthiness through
dictator and trust games is implemented with random and anonymous groups of three. Between
the baseline and the ex-post measurement, a solidarity game is played with the same anonymous
groups as in the ex-post measurement of other-regarding preferences, during which the shock
structure and the availability of formal insurance are varied exogenously. The findings suggest
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that the effect of insurance depends on (1) the covariance structure of shocks and (2) is different
for the insured and non-insured members within a network. Insurance either decreases trust levels
of the uninsured or increases trust levels of the insured subjects towards the other network
members, depending on whether the shocks affects one or more than one network member at a
time. Trustworthiness and altruism remain unaffected by insurance. Furthermore, the analysis
indicates that the results are driven by a change in the dynamics of the transfer behavior within
the network induced by formal insurance. Specifically, there is evidence that subjects increase
trust levels towards their network members after receiving higher transfers relative to the
maximum possible value from them, but not after receiving higher transfers in absolute terms.
Concerning external validity of the third paper, first of all, it has been criticized that subjects
might behave more generously in dictator games where they deal with “windfall gains”, than
outside the lab where they deal with their earned money (Cherry et al. 2002). Furthermore,
dictator games that were modified from the standard version to put them into an arguably more
realistic context show a substantial reduction in giving and thereby challenge its meaningfulness
as a measure for altruism. This occurred when the possibility to withdraw money (Bardsley 2008;
List 2007), income uncertainty (Andreoni and Bernheim 2009; Dana et al. 2007), or full
anonymity (Franzen and Pointner 2012) were introduced. Nevertheless, these studies are
themselves contested on grounds of external validity. Differences in experimental protocols and
geographic location have also been found to affect outcomes in trust games (Johnson and Mislin
2011). Apart from that, it has been debated whether the trust game actually succeeds in
measuring trust, as opposed to other-regarding preferences that are not conditional on the
behavior of others (Cox 2004). These issues, however, refer more to internal than to external
validity. There are to date relatively few studies examining the external validity of other-
regarding preferences elicited in the lab by comparing them to behavior in a natural field setting.
However, reviews of the existing evidence find in majority positive correlations of contributions
in the dictator and trust game and field behavior (Camerer 2015; Galizzi and Navarro-Martínez
2015). These findings undermine the relevance of the results of the third paper regarding
potential effects of formal insurance on other-regarding preferences in communities engaged in
informal risk sharing. However, more lab-field research is needed to complement these findings.
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